I will try to deal with polls as they come in.  Smer suggests that the major numbers may come as soon as Thursday but that some may come on Friday.  We should have several data sources to work with by that point.

Until that point, all we have is the latest MVK, conducted between June 2 and June 8 (last Thursday).   The table below compares it to the most MVK poll and the averages of all polls from April and May:

Party	Average of Polls		MVK Polls
	April	May	June	Change from May
Smer	33.6	30.6	30.4	-0.8
HZDS	12.2	10.7	10.1	0.4
SMK	9.6	10.1	9.0	-1.6
KDH	9.0	9.6	10.2	1.3
SNS	8.0	9.0	8.3	-1.6
SDKU	9.3	9.9	11.4	2.5
SF	7.5	6.6	7.5	0.7
KSS	4.5	5.4	4.8	-1.7
HZD	1.9	2.3	1.6	-0.7
ANO	2.8	2.8	2.4	-0.4

The central story here is consistency:  the June numbers differ little from the previous month, either from MVK’s own polls or from the average of all polls.  Of the differences, many are the direction that the turnout-based model predicts: SDKU, KDH and HZDS show gain (greatest for SDKU) in the final weeks, Smer and SNS show a loss.  The other three parties do not follow the predicted pattern: SF increases slightly, KSS decreases slightly and SMK decreases by a somewhat larger amount.  This last change is an important sign that individual polls cannot be taken too seriously (even if they offer support to a model that the author wants to show is valid).  There is no obvious reason why SMK’s support would drop at all, much less by 1.6 percentage points, and so this is clearly an artifact of the polling methodology and the margin of error inherent in any sampling.  But if SMK’s poll numbers change despite fundamental stability of the party’s electoral base, then this could be true of any of the other numbers as well.  For now it’s best to wait for the other polls for a final average.

In the bigger picture, even if the changes can be taken as real, they have very little effect on the formation of a government.  The parliament that would emerge from the MVK numbers is so close to that which would emerge from the previous month’s average numbers as to make little difference.  As before, there almost is no chance for a SDKU-led coalition, and as before Smer will require three parties to form a government (and as before, my turnout model suggests that a Smer-SNS-HZDS government could not muster a majority).   The only real change suggested by the recent MVK numbers is the possible absence of KSS, but MVK chair Haulik immediately nuanced the numbers to suggest that KSS still had a good chance of making it through.

More numbers will probably tell the same story of stability, but I will nevertheless attempt to analyze them as they come in.

One brief note: Despite the internal conflicts within SF, the latest MVK opinion poll shows no decrease, and in fact shows a slight increase over the party’s results in the MVK poll of two weeks ago (from 6.8 to 7.5).  It is notable, however, that MVK chair Haulik singles out SF for its risk of falling below the threshold rather than KSS which actually polled only 4.8% in the same survey.  While MVK is not publishing the data, Haulik alludes to significant weakness in the committment of those who list SF as their main preference.  This is no surprise since it echos the findings of FOCUS/IVO and UVVM.  As before, polls above 5% do not mean that SF is safe (though this one is important for bucking the otherwise emerging trend), but should the remaining poll numbers for SF drop below 5%, the party is in big trouble.

Two quick notes:

First, the most recent MVK poll puts KSS at 4.8% which leads Pravda to conclude that "SF would succeed but not KSS" despite the fact that the in an accompanying piece,  the paper publishes analysis by Pavol Haulik which suggests that the party would succeed because of its "hidden voters.  The track record of the past four years suggests that Haulik is probably closer to the truth.  Furthermore, while I argued that  consistent poll showings below 5% will hurt the parties on the margins (as their voters realize the futility and switch elsewhere), a result of 4.8% is probably close enough to be within some sort of "margin of hope" and may actually bring a few people out because they feel their votes might make a positive difference.  This is all conjecture.  The big news will apparently come on Thursday and Friday with the last minute results of major polls. 

Second, in my previous post on KSS, I argued that if KSS and SF were to fall below the 5% threshold ",a two-party government led by Smer is almost
assured."  In retrospect, this is almost assuredly wrong.   I lazily based that calculation on the opinion poll percentages rather than guesses about parliamentary representation based on past results.  Since Smer is almost certainly over-polling, this correction is necessary.  Using my own estimation (which may be a bit unfavorable to Smer but probably not by much), exclusion of KSS and SF does not create many opportunities for a two-party government.  In fact, as the graph below shows, even the two largest parties according to this estimation (Smer and SDKU) would together reach only 75 votes (and this model may be slightly too favorable to SDKU).  It will take unlikely circumstances to permit a two-party majority government in Slovakia after Saturday’s election.

Yesterday’s post promised boring details about the prediction models posted there.  I will try to temper the boring details with brevity.

This guess about outcomes is based on polls, but it is not enough simply to take a poll and apply the mathematical formula for calculating the number of seats (an observation that Slovak papers have been frustratingly slow to incorporate).  To make a meaningful prediction based on polls it is necessary to answer several questions:

1. What are the actual polling numbers?
   In practice this requires predictors to use more than one poll.  I have tried to solve this problem here by averaging all polls for each calendar month.  This throws away some information about trend, since some polls are taken at different times than others, but I tend to think that it is preferable to miss trends than it is to assume that random, sample-based variations in survey results actually reflect trends.  Fortunately, the polling numbers of various firms tend to correspond quite well, with the exception of a few survey firms.  The graph and table below give the average of results from multiple firms.

   

   

2. How do polling numbers translate into votes?
   This question is much harder.  We can use a variety of data sources that determine the degree to which those who specify a particular party (or a disinclination to vote) will actually go out and vote for that party.  Unfortunately, despite my best efforts, I have only been able to obtain some of the information: the degree to which party voters are attracted to other parties as an alternative.  An even more relevant question is the degree to which party supporters are willing actually to go out and vote.  I’ve been able to glean some of this from news sources (many firms have promised this information to clients on a proprietary basis) and from analogies to extensive 2002 data sources, but these are woefully incomplete. 

   Without the information necessary to get into voters’ heads, the best alternative–and the mainstay of my analysis here–but simply to assume that voters will both speak and act in the way they have in the past, in other words that polling numbers will translate into votes at the same rates as in previous elections.  The limitations of this approach are so obvious that they need little comment, but with little else available this is where my efforts at prediction begin.   This way of answering the question requires answering two further questions

1. To what degree will party supporters turn actually vote?
   My efforts here begin from the baseline that if everyone voted, the results would look like polls (this is a flawed beginning, but not entirely implausible, especially if you believe, as I do, that campaigns do not have a particularly large effect).  From there, I look at levels of actual turnout and actual vote for particular parties and use the results to calculate to what degree a drop in overall turnout will correspond to a drop in the turnout of likely voters for a particular party.  This, of course, depends on which election is used for a baseline.  I have created models based on the 2002 parliamentary election and the 2004 Europarliament election.  The former suggests extremely high turnout effects for particular parties (major losses for Smer, gains for SDKU); the latter shows relatively low turnout effects, but the patterns tend to be quite consistent with 2002.   In an arbitrary, but I hope not unjustified, choice, I have based my own predictions on an average of these two models.  Inserting the most recent polling average into these equations produces the following results, displayed here both as graph and table.

   

   

   These calculations differ from my earliest model not only in the use of the most recent polling data but in the modification of assumptions for SF.  Since the party did not campaign in 2002, I used a zero-slope for that part of the equation but in retrospect it is clear that this is not sufficient.  For lack of better data, I have assumed that the behavior of SF voters would resemble that of other new party voters and so have based the assumptions on an average of voter behavior for the new parties of 2002 (ANO, HZD, SDA and Smer).  This is highly questionable, I know, but better than leaving the answer blank.

2. To what degree will Slovakia’s electorate actually vote?
   One advantage of this model is that it allows for some degree of sensitivity to turnout.  The tendency of parties to outperform or underperform their polling numbers obviously depends on a number of factors and is not the same from election to election.  A turnout-based model allows us to incorporate, for example, Smer’s significant under-performance in the 2004 Europarliament election (28.3% in polls but only 16.9% of votes cast) without assuming that the party would experience such significant losses in a larger turnout election.

   Employing these assumptions, however, requires a meaningful guess about the actual turnout.  Here I am limited by available data.  My only basis for predicting turnout is to look at figures from polls for those who say they will not vote or do not know who they will vote for (often a good proxy for staying home) and to compare these to the previous election.  Current data shows the average number of "won’t vote and don’t know" in multiple polls for May to be  just over 30%.  In 2002 at a corresponding time period, the average was just under 27%.  All else being equal–which it never is–this suggests a turnout about 3% lower than last time, or about 66%.  This is the baseline that I have so far used in my predictions.

   Another, baseline, less secure but nevertheless interesting, can be derived from more nuanced questions about participation itself.  Here, however, we have only partial data and approximate comparisons.  The most recent results reported by MVK suggest that 38.2% of respondents would certainly vote.  In a corresponding poll from 2002 by FOCUS, 46.6% of respondents announced their firm intent to vote, suggesting a difference of 8.4% or a turnout of about 61%.  Unfortunately, however, the question asked by FOCUS offers different options, including "probably will vote" and "probably won’t vote" and so the results are not strictly comparable.  Still, this comparison suggets that MVK’s estimates of 46% to 54% are probably too low.

   A final brief note:  this sort of comparative baseline, while always flawed, is absolutely necessary to make any reasonable guess.  Stories like Pravda’s "60% would come to the ballot box" make the same mistake as the other analysis of polling numbers discussed above, taking respondents at their word without seeing how their word translated in the past into votes.  For this consistent oversight, much of the Slovak press deserves low marks.

What does it all portend?
As the above analysis indicates, there are many sets of assumptions, and error in any of these will produce faulty results.  My hope, however, is that best guesses in each based on contextually-grounded comparisons will yield a fairly accurate outcome from the model without too much ad hoc tweaking of guesses for individual parties (though of course as my SF modification shows, ad hoc circumstances may cause me to change the model).

In developing this model, I have been pleased to see that the results correspond to certain presumptions that I share with others who follow these developments: 

• that SMK, KDH, and HZDS will gain from low turnout because of their stable electorates but that they will not gain enormous amounts
• that Smer will not do as well as its numbers predict (Interestingly, Pavol Haulik of MVK   has been emphatic on this point–which is understandable since he will be judged by the performance of his polls–and on numerous occasions has suggested directly or indirectly that Smer will fall short of its current numbers, including an interesting recent suggestion that late polls showing a Smer victory may lower the party’s margin since "Slovaks do not like it when somebody wins too much")
• that KSS has some hidden strengths that may allow it to cross the 5% threshold regardless of its current weakness, particularly in a low-turnout election.
• that SNS is reaping some benefit from its position as a non-parliamentary party and that these, as with Smer, may be reflected in voting that is lower than the polled numbers.
• that SDKU somehow manages to pull rabbits out of hats (even when the data offers little reason for expecting it). 

Obviously this last point–the expectation of magic–is the weakest of
all here, and therefore the most suspect.  At a certain point, however
it may not be that relevant since even the best prediction for SDKU will not put it in a position to form a government, and only a limit case analysis of numbers would even allow it to form a two-party coalition with Smer.

But more on that in another post.

Time to abandon caution and jump.  If I were to bet on Slovakia’s election based on the information we have now, I split my money between two results: 

this one…

or this one…

Before the tedious details about how I reached these conclusions, a few thoughts about what they signify:

• Ambivalence about the electoral chances of SF.  A month ago I had few doubts.  Now, the combination of recent internal turmoil and longstanding weakness of voter support, the party appears to be in serious trouble.  Hence the two result hedge.  Should new poll results this week show a declining trend, I will abandon the first set of results and go with the second.
• Unambivalence about coalition possibilities.  Whether SF makes it into parliament or not actually does not much affect coalition possibilities.  It eliminates the possibility of coalitions with SF, of course, but beyond that not much is different: there is still no viable two-party coalition (even in the no-SF variant, Smer+SDKU musters only 67); there is still no way for the current coalition to remain in power without taking on an additional partner (which, as long as Meciar remains head of HZDS, means only Smer); there is still no likely coalition without at least one member of the current coalition (the Smer-SNS-HZDS coalition still does not manage a majority though without SF it falls only one seat short).
• Expectations of Smer’s weakness.  The main difference between the models above and those based on straight-up poll results (the kind constantly appearing in the Slovak press) is that these incorporate past relationships between polling and actual results.  In both of the last elections, the party has fallen far short of its preferences and this model assumes that it will do so again (though not by as great a degree).  This, of course, assumes in turn that nothing else has changed and such assumptions are always dangerous.  Still, there are reasons to believe that the party has maximized its support among the discontented and that many of these simply will not bother to go out and vote.
• Expectations of SDKU’s strength.  This is the weakest part of the model.  Polling data just does not show much reason to expect that SDKU will pick up huge numbers of voters in the last minute, but the data was almost as silent on this in 2002 and 2004 and still the party significantly exceeded its polling totals.  So I allow history to guide this part of the prediction, though (as with Smer) to a more moderate degree.
• Ambivalence about purely mathematical models. My thoughts about SF demonstrate the difficulty of analysis from abroad and the degree to which political science’s models are heavily dependent on .  As I worked on SF’s poll numbers, I saw some weakness but did not really give it as serious consideration as I should have until I received a report from a friend in Slovakia expressing serious doubts about the party’s electoral viability.  I then went back and reanalyzed the numbers and found it to be worse than I thought.  But without that report and the subsequent renanalysis, I might not even have bothered to create the "No SF" option that I now think to be the most probable.  Fingerspitzgefuhl remains essential, thought technology does sometimes help make it easier to do something productive when the fingers have no choice but to remain on another continent.

Two months ago, Slobodne Forum’s electoral fortunes
seemed secure. Its support stood
comfortably between 7% and 8%, not quite enough to join the traffic jam of
other parties at the 10% mark, but enough to ensure its entry into parliament despite certain structural weaknesses.

One month ago, all three major polls (UVVM, FOCUS, MVK)
showed a drop in SF’s electoral fortunes; this month all three polls
showed a further decline.  Except for dropping support for Smer (which can afford the losses), this is the most consistent evidence of
decline for support for any party in Slovakia in the past year. As the graph below shows, the only bright
spots for the party have been increases in the results recorded by the less
regular, and less consistent results reported by Dicio and Median. Nor is

are the firms in the second tier of survey
providers unanimous in predicting higher support. In fact OMV for May shows a drop of more than
2.5% to the very margin of electoral viability.

Of course in comparison to KSS, SF’s fortune’s still seem
secure. Whereas KSS’s poll results
cluster above and below 5%, SF’s tend to be at least 1.5% above the danger
line. According to the graph below, the
party’s three- and one-month trendlines show decline, but even these, when
projected June 17, still put the party above 5%.

This good news, however, must be weighed against several
other factors that suggest the party’s support is weaker than it looks:

• Weak voter loyalty toward new parties
  Smaller and particularly newer parties in Slovakia frequently underperform their polling numbers as voters decide at the last minute to stick with larger and more established parties. In 2002, Smer’s average polling numbers
       dropped by 25%, as did those of SDL and SDA and the divided SNS. ANO’s dropped by 11%. (Only KSS and PSNS showed an increase and both of those could arguably be understood as somewhat more-established parties, KSS having campaigned in most previous elections and PSNS led by the past president of SNS, Jan Slota.) In 1998, SOP averaged 16% in UVVM surveys over the three months before the election but received only 8% of all votes cast, a drop of 50%. SF may not experience this significant a drop, but even the common 20% drop would mean electoral failure.
• Weak SF voter loyalty
  A variety of surveys suggest that SF has a particularly weak base. One publicly available such survey, that of the Institute for Public Affairs (http://www.ivo.sk/vyskum_maj_2006.htm,
  see also Pravda 19.05.06) suggests that of those preferring for SF, 7% would
  certainly vote for the party, 65% would probably do so, and 28% might vote
  for somebody else. Not only is this
  the lowest share of “certain” voters for any party in Slovakia
  (by a significant margin) but it is also the highest “maybe not.” Notably, it is also significantly worse
  than /any/ of the new parties in 2002 at a corresponding point in the electoral cycle (Smer, which lost 25% of its poll support had 28% certain, 53% probable, and 18% maybe not; ANO, which lost 11% of its poll support had 14% certain, 68% probable, and 18% maybe not).  Not only are SF voters relatively
       uncommitted to their party, but many have recourse to an easy alternative. As in 2002, voters for new parties tend to have net positive evaluations only of other new parties.
       In 2002 Smer voters expressed sympathy for ANO by a ratio of 63:37; ANO voters expressed sympathy for Smer by a ratio of 61:39. Among April 2004 supporters of SF, the  ratio of sympathy to antipathy for Smer is even higher than these past marks: 64:34 (and this is a slight decline from the 71:27 ratio of  November). SF voters also offer relatively high and increasing levels of approval for Smer chair Robert Fico: 22% in
       November 2005, 35% in April 2006.
• Divided SF leadership
  On factor that is difficult to calculate but sure to affect the SF’s outcome is its recent bout of internal turmoil. Some observers believe the problems to be so severe as to make it “hard to see SF crossing the threshold now.” 

Given these problems, it is not a surprise that Tipos odds,
recalculated as probabilities, offer a 46.6% chance that SF will clear the
five-percent threshold and that the odds have worsened by almost two percentage
points in the past two days. The true
test will come when polls emerge that cover the last several weeks of turmoil
within the party. Even strong numbers
will not guarantee the party’s success, but continued or increased weakness
will doom the party.  The question then would
be the degree to which the remaining SF voters would stay with their chosen
party or shift. If the latter, the
question is where, and Smer looks set to reap the most.

In the coming days, I will look at polling results for each
party with an eye to trends in indivdual series of polls and composite polling
averages for each month.   This analysis will stay at what I will
call "level 1," which is the compilation and assessment of polling
numbers, and only rarely moving to  "level 2," which is the
assessment of how polling numbers might translate into actual votes and seats,
and no attention to "level 3," which is the assessment of how seats
might translate into an actual government.  These will be the subject of
other posts.

I start with perhaps the most interesting and consequential of all election
questions: whether KSS will gain enough votes to pass the 5% threshold for
representation.

KSS poll results are tantalizing and in themselves offer no
clear answer about whether the party will pass the 5% threshold. This uncertainty is reflected in current
betting line on Tipos (http://tipkurz.etip.sk/CategoryRows.aspx?CatIDs=2380 )
which gives identical odds for KSS’s success and failure.

The betting line here seems well
calculated. As the first graph shows, the
average of poll results for each month has remained within 0.5 percentage
points for all of 2006, though individual polls show the party as much as 2
percentage points above or below. Nor do
those polls show consistent patterns. Within 2006 alone, every major polling series except Dicio has shown KSS
to be above the threshold in some months and at or below the threshold in at
least one another month. (Within this
variation, Dicio and UVVM produce results that are consistently below the
others for the last twelve months. Over
the last three years results for KSS were lowest on surveys by Median and UVVM
while FOCUS and MVK showed higher-than-average KSS results.)  As the graph below shows, even trendlines are
mixed, with otherwise quite different 1-month and 12-month trend lines both suggesting
a result above the 5% threshold, and almost identical 3-month, 6-month trendlines
suggesting a 4.5% result.

This inconsistency itself may have some effect on the vote
since voters who are uncertain of a party’s viability may opt for an
alternative.  This is especially
important since Smer’s adoption of a more clearly “social democratic” name and
platform might make Smer a slightly more palatable alternative for worried KSS
voters than it had been in the past. In
fact comparisons with 2002, while limited in their applicability suggest that the
KSS voters were more ambivalent about Smer in 2002 (the ratio of positives to
negatives averaged 56:44 with a declining trend as the election neared) than
they have been in 2005-2006 (the ratio of positives to negatives in recent IVO
surveys shows a much higher and rising trend, from 61:34 in November 2005 to 71:27
in April 2006).  

Figures from 2002 also suggest that while KSS voters were
less likely than major-party voters to shun a party that was not viable, they too
were not entirely immune to considerations of viability (in May 2002 nearly 100%
of KSS voters agreed that “One should vote according to his/her convictions,
and not by the party’s size” but at the same time nearly 70% of KSS voters
acknowledged that “It make no sense to vote small parties, because this would
mean just a waste of the votes” (the same share as the in the overall
population).

With half of all recent polls showing KSS below the
threshold, and headlines like Pravda’s June 1, “KSS
would not get into parliament,” enough KSS voters may become sufficiently
discouraged to push the party’s numbers down further.  The available information suggests a slight
presumption against KSS in parliament
but there simply is not enough data to make a firm assessment. 

Whether KSS succeeds or not may have a fundamental affect on
the composition of Slovakia’s next government, not because there is much chance
that KSS will be in the government (too many parties have categorically
rejected cooperation with KSS) but because the redistribution of seats that
might otherwise have gone to KSS will enlarge the totals of all other parties
and increase the chances that Smer could drastically reduce its negotiation
costs and form a coalition with only one other party.  Indeed if recent trouble in SF pushes that
party below the 5% threshold, a two-party government led by Smer is almost
assured.

The May polls are now all out (now that the firm MVK  has released its results) and we can look to see what changed in May.  The big news is that there is no real news.  The overall pattern remains largely the same with only minor changes from March (the last time I did the full analysis).  For those with an eye to detail, however, there are some noteworthy developments:

1.        Traffic Jam at 10%

As before, the overall poll results–based here on an averaging of polls conducted within each month period by UVVM, MVK, FOCUS and, when available, Dicio, Meridian, Polis and IVO–show Smer almost exactly where it was in March, with more than three times as much support as its nearest rival.

Those rivals (HZDS, SMK, KDH, SDKU and SNS) have converged even further
into what is essentially a five-way tie for second place at 10% each.
Two other parties (SF and KSS) hover between 10% and the 5% threshold,
closer to the latter than the former.  The graphs below show this part of the chart in closer detail, the first in a precise but rather chaotic line graph, the second with smoother, parabolic trendlines which are easier on the eyes but not necessarily as accurate, because trendlines reflect particular kinds of guesses about how to interpret differences over time.  In a future post I will look more closely at various ways to interpret recent trends in party support.

2.        Intra-Bloc stability

Since much of the change came as trade-offs among similar parties, the voting within what I have called "blocs"–more in reference to the type and orientation of party rather than the coalition potential–shows no change whatsoever.

For this reason, little change is apparent in the a raw translation of votes into parliamentary seats.  In fact the seat totals for Smer, KSS, SMK and SDKU are exactly the same as two months ago while there has been a one seat transfer from SF to KDH and a two seat transfer from HZDS to SNS.

Two notes of caution are necessary here, however:

• The 5% threshold:
  While the change from March to May is quite minor, the results for April represented a rather significant shift (+6 for Smer, +1 for the "Right" bloc and +1 for the "National" bloc) even though actual preferences for particular blocs only changed by a slight amount.  The reason, of course, is that for the first time in over a year, the average score for KSS fell below the 5% threshold and its seats went to Smer and the six other parties above the threshold (the national bloc actually gained despite a slight drop in overall preferences, for example).  Given the tenuous hold that KSS and (perhaps SF) have on the 5% line, this is a reminder that even the most careful calculations about coalition possibilities are subject to significant change if one of these parties drops even one vote below 5%.  In future posts I will try to assess chances for KSS and SF based on evidence at hand.
• Preferences v. Votes
  As previous posts show, preferences in 2002 and 2004 were quite stable but corresponded relatively poorly to outcomes.  The fact that preferences between March and May were stable means that the various estimation models made in March would not change much, but these are good guides only to the extent that the model is relatively accurate.   As the only source of data for those models is previous elections, they are still rather limited.  There are other, more current information that can shed light on the translation of preferences into votes including the "firmness of decision" among party voters and the "likelihood of turnout" among party voters.  Data for the former has become publicly available, but as some have noted, its relevance is highly questionable.  The "likelihood of turnout" is a far better indicator (especially in concert with the "firmness of decision" data) but it is far more difficult to obtain.  I am trying, however, and with luck I will shortly be able to create a preference-into-vote model that is stronger for resting on two or three legs.

This reflects only a bare summary.  I hope in the next few days to deal with the questions of differences among particular polls, of trends related to the preferences of various parties, and of a better preference-into-vote model.

There is more polling analysis to come, but I want to post some more immediate evidence of the campaign: campaign billboard photos taken by Martin Votruba of the University of Pittsburgh and his brief commentary.

Martin Votruba writes:
Here are my renditions/explanations rather than regular translations:

SF = A circle for # 80 (preferential voting?); [we] thank you; Decent life, here and now

SNS = Slovak Government for the Slovaks; We vote for SNS

SNS = We are Slovaks!  We vote for SNS

SDKU = What’s at issue is [freely: the/our goal is] quality education and strong economy

SDKU = What’s at issue for us is [freely: "our goal is"] a successful Slovakia

Smer = Towards [facing] people. ["In people’s direction"]

KDH = For real values. For family. For you.; For a decent life in Slovakia.

HZD = The President trusts us. Vote for his program!

ANO = She? Yes/ANO!!! Separation of Church(es) and state

ANO = She? Yes/ANO!!! English [language classes?] for everyone

ANO = She? Yes/ANO!!!; A thirteenth pension [to be paid each December]

I don’t have any by HZDS at the moment, but I saw a few.  They’re harder to read from a passing car because they have a bit (just a bit) more text than the ones I include, and rather than people, they show some cartoon character(s) like from an animated commercial.

I find the layout of all these ads strikingly ( boringly) similar, and their overwhelming emphasis on faces rather than slogans somewhat unexpected since people are asked to vote for a party, not for their own local candidate: I’m not sure to what degree some of the faces are widely recognizable.  Overall, I consider the ones by ANO more inventive than the others, although not by much since their layout is equally uninventive.  But they at least have that word play (ona/ano) with their female candidates.

THE SUREST WAY TO KILL A BLOG, it is said, is to miss regular
postings.  By that standard, I firmly planted this page in the grave when I left a month ago to shepherd students
around Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Nevertheless, there is a month left
before Slovakia’s election and there is a lot of potentially useful analysis that has been left undone by
Slovakia’s popular press.  So I will regard this blog as only mostly dead, an attempt a resurrection.
(As before, a .pdf version of this post is available here:
Download slovak_election_blog_3_coalitions.pdf

)

COALITION POSSIBILITIES
In the last posts, I discussed trends in overall support for parties and how
that might translate into actual seats in parliament.  (Since the last posts in
April, we now have a variety of new polls and other data for estimating election
results.  I hope this week to post some revised estimates.)  The final major
question is how parties might combine those seats to form a government.  This is
a realm of great uncertainty, not only because it is depends on polling data
allows for a wide range variance in the partisan composition of parliament, but
also because the decisions of political leaders to form coalitions can be abrupt
and highly idiosyncratic.  It is also the kind of insider realm in which an
American writing from across the Atlantic is most limited in divining the
future. 

Nevertheless, certain kinds of quantitative analysis can offer certain insights
which may not predict what the next coalition will be but might at least draw
certain lines which coalitions may have more favorable conditions than others. 
The two key questions are the likelihood that a particular coalition
combinations will dispose of enough seats to form a government and the
likelihood that the members of that coalition can actually agree to work
together.  The first of these we can assess from public opinion polling data, as
modified by guesses about partisan turnout; the second we cannot assess
directly, but we can look at incomplete and indirect measures such as the
statements of party leaders and the opinions of parties’ supporters about other
parties.

Given the sources of my data, I would like to begin not with the coalitions
assessed as most likely but rather with the full set of possible coalitions. 
Six parties will almost assuredly pass the 5% threshold (Smer, HZDS, MKP/SMK, SDKU,
KDH and SNS) and another two have a strong chance (SF and, to a lesser extent,
KSS).  With eight parties in parliament, there are actually 2^8 or 256 possible
coalitions (including one coalition consisting of "no parties" and another
consisting of "all parties").  The helpful figure below begins to hint at the
complexity.

Figure 3.1. Set of Potential Coalition Relationships in Slovakia

Not all of these coalitions are possible.  Some are too small to muster a
majority, while others could shed one or more parties without losing a
majority.  Using the best- and worst-case scenarios for parties that I derived
from the various turnout models discussed previously, I calculate that 40 of the
possible coalitions would be larger than necessary even under all the respective
parties’ worst-case scenarios.  Another 93 would be insufficient even under all
of the respective parties’ best-case scenarios.  Notably, this includes a
variety of governments that are sometimes talked about because they might be
able to muster some sort of ideological consistency:  Smer alone, Smer with KSS,
Smer with SNS, Smer with SF, and HZDS with SNS and KSS.

WHAT PARTIES SAY ABOUT COALITIONS
This analysis still leaves us with 123 coalition that might in some or all
circumstances be the right size to form a government.  Many of these are highly
unlikely, however, because of lingering antipathies between parties along
ideological grounds. 

First, there is the question of Slovak and Hungarian nationalism.  Even
though the underlying basis of Slovakia’s politics has begun to shift away from
this question, the antipathies between the Hungarian party and the two more
nationally oriented Slovak parties, HZDS and SNS, remains extremely high.  It is
difficult to imagine Hungarian and Slovak nationalist parties in common
coalition and the MKP/SMK has explicitly rejected the possibility of coalition with
SNS or with HZDS under the leadership of Vladimir Meciar (a circumstance that
looks unlikely to change).  SF also rejected coalition with either SNS or a
Meciar-led HZDS, and KDH has rejected coalition with HZDS as well.  After
seeming to reject HZDS, SDKU appears to have backed off from outright
rejection.

Second, there is also the question of socio-economic policy.  Distributional
issues are often more amenable to compromise than identity issues, but in the
case the Communist Party of Slovakia, a redistributionist policy is paired with
an "unreconstructed" Marxist-Leninist identity (or at least the image of one)
which evokes strong mutual antipathies.  The parties of the current coalition
explicitly rejected post-election cooperation with KSS and the feeling appears
largely mutual.  All major right wing parties (SDKU, KDH, MPK/SMK and SF) have
explicitly rejected cooperation with KSS, as has SNS.  Alone among the coalition
parties, MKP/SMK also seems to reject cooperation with Smer.

In light of these statements—full text of which can be found in the appendix
at the end of this post—it is possible to redraw the octagon above with colored
lines highlighting the impossible coalition combinations and with black lines
highlighting the remaining possibilities, a rather simpler set of relationships
to work with.

Figure 3.2. Unlikely Coalition Relationships According to Party Statements

Figure 3.3. Revised Set of Coalition Relationships

WHAT VOTERS SAY ABOUT COALITIONS
Of course pre-election statements by party leaders are
often poor guides to post-election behavior but politicians face coalition
constraints other than their own promises.  Fortunately, Slovakia’s Institute
for Public Affairs (http://www.ivo.sk)
a series of excellent reports (see

www.ivo.sk/vyskum_slovensko2005.pdf,

http://www.ivo.sk/vyskum_maj_2006.htm and

http://www.ivo.sk/vyskum_maj_2006.ppt) on polls that ask supporters of each
party what they think of all other parties.  The IVO reports list the share of
supporters in each party who express either sympathy or antipathy toward every
other party.  In the tables below, I have simplified this into a single table by
subtracting the share of antipathy from the share of sympathy (thus a party with
more sympathy than antipathy will have a positive score while greater antipathy
produces a negative score).

Table 3.1 Sympathy/Antipathy of Party Voters toward
Other Parties, Dec. 2005

Table 3.2 Sympathy/Antipathy of Party Voters toward
Other Parties, April 2006

It is possible further to reduce this array of numbers to a
more accessible image depicting the degree of sympathy or antipathy in terms of
distance.  A completely accurate image of this nature would require eight
dimensions, but two dimensions proves to be enough to capture basic
relationships without too much distortion.  The dimensions do not measure
anything in themselves, but the distance between any two points on the graph is
roughly proportionate to the degree of overall antipathy.  It is worth noting,
furthermore that two surveys separated by nearly six months produced nearly
identical results.

Figure 3.4 Spatial Relationships among Parties, Dec 2005
and April 2006

In most cases, party supporters’ views about coalition
partners correspond with the statements of party leaders (the cause and effect
in that relationship warrant a much longer and more detailed discussion
elsewhere.  See

http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/apworkshop/carsey-layman-oct04.pdf for
starters).  Many of the relationships with greatest spatial distance are also
those with explicit (sometimes mutual) rejections of cooperation: SDKU-KSS,
KDH-KSS, SMK-KSS, SMK-SNS, SMK-HZDS.  The combination of high distance among
leaders and voters makes these the least likely combinations.  A few other
relationships have a high degree of leadership antipathy but less among
partisans (SNS-HZDS, SNS-KSS and, by the direct measures of distance, SMK-Smer);
in such cases the party membership at least will not present a barrier to
coalition if the chance for political gain (and the lack of alternatives) force
elites to change their minds and seek accommodation.  In other cases, a high
degree of voter antipathy has not produced an official rejection of cooperation
(SDKU-HZDS, SDKU-SNS, KDH-SNS, KDH-Smer, SDKU-Smer) as political leaders attempt
to keep their options open.  Although parties tend to remain fairly close to
their bases on important issues, pressures remain fairly indirect and slow
moving and may not prevent such coalitions from coming into play in the short
run.  A KDH-DU-SDĽ coalition was equally unlikely in 1994 but party leaders
managed to make it work in the short run. 

SLOVAK ROULETTE
On the basis of elite-level and mass-level party antipathy,
we can create a list of possible coalitions and then revisit their actual
chances for success.  The considerations above actually suggest two lists: a
“strict” list that includes only coalitions in which neither the parties nor the
party voters have expressed strong opposition, and a second, looser list which
recognizes that party statements may only reflect political posturing and
therefore only excludes the Slovak nationalist-Hungarian, and right-Communist
combinations.  Application of the “strict” conditions actually cuts the number
of potentially viable coalitions from 123 to a more manageable 12.  These are
listed below, ranked according to the potential size of the coalition in
parliament (according to the previously calculated best-, worst-, and
intermediate-case scenarios). 

Figure 3.5. Coalitions Possible under “Strict”
Conditions Organized by Likely Coalition Size

    

Most notable about this list is that only one of the twelve
does not contain the party Smer and that this coalition (essentially replicating
the coalition of 2002 with SF substituting for ANO) receives a parliamentary
majority only in the best-case scenario.  Almost as unlikely are any coalitions
of Smer with only one other party.  In best-case scenarios using April data it
is just barely possible that Smer could partner with HZDS or SDKU, but the
chances remain relatively small.  (A Smer-KDH coalition falls just short of a
majority in even the best-case scenario, though the margin is quite narrow). 
More viable in numeric terms are a variety of 3 and 4 party coalitions that
including Smer along with some combination of members of the current coalition
(SDKU-KDH, KDH-SF or SDKU-SF), members of the current opposition (HZDS and KSS),
or a mix of (KDH-SNS, SDKU-SNS, HZDS-SDKU).

The problem with these larger coalitions, however, is that
they introduce greater potential for intra-coalition conflict.  Figures 3.6 and
3.7 rank the potential “strict” coalitions both according to seat potential and
the degree of likely intra-coalition strife as measured by the opinions of party
supporters about their potential coalition partners.  (Equivalent figures for
the 42 party “loose” standard for possible coalitions are available in the
appendix below.).  The first graph measures internal cohesion as an average of
the degree of sympathy held by supporters of each coalition member toward every
other coalition member.  The second graph begins from the notion that coalitions
are only as strong as their weakest internal link and therefore measures
internal cohesion as the lowest-level of mutual sympathy among any pair of
potential coalition members.

Figure 3.6 Coalition Vote Potential According to
Antipathy among Potential Members’ Voters (Average Antipathy)

Figure 3.7 Coalition Vote Potential According to
Antipathy among Potential Members’ Voters (Weakest Link)

The goal for any coalition is the upper-right quadrant
(high internal sympathy and sufficient numbers for a majority), but it is
apparent that none of the current possibilities come particularly close to
achieving that goal.  Coalitions are either large enough to have a majority but
highly fractious (at least as measured by party voters’ opinions) or relatively
more coherent but too small.  A comparison between the 2006 data and equivalent
data for 2002 offers an even more troubling sign.  A star on Figures 3.6 and 3.7
marks the viability and internal cohesion of the potential SDKU-SMK-KDH-ANO
coalition about two months before the 2002 election.  As the graphs show, this
fractious coalition performed considerably better in terms of internal
coherence than any of the coalitions that now seem viable.  Slovaks might
be advised to fasten their seatbelts.  (Yet for those of us conditioned by the
politics of Slovakia in the mid-1990’s, a bumpy coalition is better than one
that smoothly steers the country toward authoritarianism.)

 

PLANS FOR FUTURE POSTINGS

Having created a system for tracking opinion polls,
estimating the effects of turnout on relative party vote and assessing the
viability of party coalitions, there still remains work to be done.  The next
posts will assess the impact of the most recent set of polls—late April and
early May—and use these to track both individual party and potential coalition
performance over time.  Another post will use data on voters’ decision-making
process to refine the turnout-based model of party electoral performance.

Appendix A: Party Statements Rejecting Potential
Coalition Partners

The following is a not-yet-exhaustive list of ways in which
parties refused the possibility of cooperation with other parties.  If readers
are aware of any other exclusions, I would encourage them to let me know.

• KDH rejects HZDS:

zostavovaní novej vlády po
parlamentných voľbách nebude Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie (KDH) rokovať s
Ľudovou stranou – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (ĽS-HZDS). Svojmu duelantovi
Vladimírovi Mečiarovi povedal, že spolupráca s ním nie je možná. (http://spravy.pravda.sk/sk_domace.asp?r=sk_domace&c=A060224_073946_sk_domace_p02
and

http://spravy.pravda.sk/kdh-nezostavi-vladu-s-ls-hzds-djn-/sk_domace.asp?c=A060409_151118_sk_domace_p23)

• SDKU rejects KSS:

Jediná politická strana, s ktorou
nie je SDKÚ-DS ochotná ísť do budúcej vlády, je KSS. Podpredseda strany a
minister dopravy Pavol Prokopovič v relácii TV Joj Sedmička povedal, že so
všetkými ostatnými stranami si SDKÚ vie predstaviť spoluprácu, ak bude vedieť
nájsť s nimi styčné body v programoch. (http://spravy.pravda.sk/sdku-nebude-spolupracovat-s-kss-dad-/sk_domace.asp?c=A060507_134638_sk_domace_p12)

• SF rejects KSS, SNS and HZDS with Meciar

Slobodné fórum nebude po voľbách
spolupracovať s KSS, ani s "extrémnymi" stranami ako je SNS, či s Vladimírom
Mečiarom. "Slobodné fórum nebude účastníkom vo vláde, ktorú by viedol súčasný
premiér Mikuláš Dzurinda," povedala predsedníčka SF Zuzana Martináková.  (http://spravy.pravda.sk/sf-hovori-nie-kss-sns-aj-meciarovi-drd-/sk_domace.asp?c=A060503_141208_sk_domace_p12)

• MKP/SMK rejects SNS and KSS:

Slovenská národná strana a
Komunistická strana Slovenska by nemali byť podľa vicepremiéra a podpredsedu SMK
Pála Csákyho v budúcej vládnej koalícii a nemali by mať ani reálny vplyv na
budúcu vládnu politiku (http://spravy.pravda.sk/csaky-nechce-vo-vlade-sns-a-kss-dei-/sk_domace.asp?c=A060520_004134_sk_domace_p12)

• MKP/SMK rejects HZDS:

Of the governing parties the MKP
(Hungarian Coalition Party — SMK in Slovak) has presented the clearest stance.
Gyula Bardos, the head of the MKP deputies group, has said that the MKP would
not differentiate according to whether Meciar is or is not head of the HZDS.
"For the MKP what is important is the politics carried out by the HZDS in the
years from 1994 until 1998, and also the policies that it wants to carry out in
future," said Bardos.  (Sme, Wednesday, February 22, 2006 T13:49:47Z:,
Translated by World News Connection)

• MKP/SMK rejects Smer:

According to MKP (Hungarian
Coalition Party — SMK in Slovak) Chairman Bela Bugar, coalition cooperation
between the MKP and Direction in the next election period is made impossible by
the parties’ different programs. According to Bugar, Direction’s program — —
is impossible to realize. Bugar did not rule out post-election cooperation with
the HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), but Vladimir Meciar remains an
obstacle to this. (Sme, Wednesday,  January 18, 2006  T12:28:53Z, Translated by
World News Connection)

• SNS rejects KSS and SMK:

We clearly reject only the
Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) and the SMK. It would be morbid if the
Communists were in the government. This perverse ideology was already dead for
me when I started to perceive the world. But we do not rule out cooperation with
anyone else. As far as the SMK is concerned, we will try to have this political
entity disbanded. (Hospodarske Noviny, Sunday, April 23, 2006 T16:22:05Z,
Translated by World News Connection)

• HZDS rejects SNS:

Meciar only ruled out
post-election cooperation with the Slovak National Party (SNS). "This is because
of its low political culture, vulgarism, and inclination toward unethical
behavior, and I cannot cooperate with Jan Slota (SNS leader)."( Sme, Tuesday,
April 11, 2006 T08:49:17Z:,  Translated by World News Connection)

Appendix B: Data for the Full “Loose” List of Potential Coalitions

The following table offers a full list of all coalitions
that are neither too large nor too small and that do not contain Slovak
nationalist-Hungarian or Right-Communist pairings.