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October 2008: UVVM

UVVM Monthly Report: October 2008

Also available in Slovak, here

UVVM reverted to the mean this month, its poll numbers pulling back from extremes for most of the major parties and toward the results obtained by other pollsters.  There are gains to be made from a comparative analysis of various polls, but as usual the major papers (http://spravy.pravda.sk/opozicne-strany-si-mierne-polepsili-dvg-/sk_domace.asp?c=A081015_151947_sk_domace_p04)
present these without a hint of analysis from ČTK  which itself takes these numbers as givens rather than as a particular (and with regard to SMK, particularly troubling) survey.

Otherwise (and maybe this is why the papers do not bother to put more energy into it) there is not much to see here that is new:

Smer leads, but not as much as before.  SDKU moves slightly upward into clearer (but far distant) second place while SNS sinks toward the other three major parties:

UVVM+poll+data+ for +all+parties+ for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia
The movement of the mid-size parties is clearer here.  Particularly troubling is the movement for SMK.  A party which has by far the most stable overall electorate and the most stable historical voting patterns has the highest level of volatility in month-to-month poll numbers of any major party in UVVM surveys (see a more in-depth post here: http://www.pozorblog.com/#/p=110).  (HZDS has also been rather volatile, and while it is possible that this party’s support is actually a bit more volatile, its major swings also seem to be more the result of survey networks than actual shifts in public opinion.)

UVVM+poll+data+ for +all+parties+except+Smer+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia
Aggregated according to blocs, the shifts above mean a slightly closer gap between opposition and coalition, but no different than the overall average for the period.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +coalition+support for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

UVVM+poll+data+ for +coalition+support for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

Vote blocs, too, stay roughly the same.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +party+'blocs'+ for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

UVVM+poll+data+ for +party+'blocs'+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

And Smer is still likely to be able to build a coalition with a single party of its own choosing.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +1+month+ in Slovakia

UVVM+poll+data+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

As always, the actual polling numbers are available online at Google Docs:

http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=pdhlCClsiyAMi39bLFpY_Zg

And the most recent three months are below in tabular format (using “iframe” which may not work on all browsers).

<br />

pozorblog po slovensky

Amid constant news of contraction and decline this week, there is (slightly old) news of yet another small but significant expansion: machine translation to and from Slovak.   Machine translation is old news these days (though it is no less remarkable for our acceptance of it) and is no panacea (it is still bad enough that without a basic understanding of the language it is easy to be deeply confused or seriously misled), but it is nice to see Slovak make the list of Google Translate languages.

For this blog it makes little difference–the population of those who are interested in what goes on here but cannot read English is infinitesimal–but it is nice to be able to make the gesture and all subsequent posts here will include a link like the one below allowing automatic translation.

http://74.125.93.104/translate_c?hl=en&sl=en&tl=sk&u=http://www.pozorblog.com/%3Fp%3D108&usg=ALkJrhgjlN7kuRnEQTuh4dfXjTjpiKFfUw

I hope in future to go one step further and install a plugin that makes that process even easier.

More Pozorblog

It has occurred to me that it might be useful for me (and maybe for others) to keep track of articles in the Slovak press that are interesting or in some way provocative and that the easiest way to do this through the social-bookmarking service called del.icio.us

I’ve therefore begun to use the tag ‘pozorblog’ in del.icio.us and all the articles with that tag are listed on a specific page:

http://delicious.com/kdecay/pozorblog

Thanks to del.icio.us this has its own RSS feed so anybody so obsessed can keep track of postings in this area. We shall see if this experiment goes anywhere.

Not To Minsk Words

I returned two days ago from Belarus where I was an observer in the 2008 parliamentary elections.

Lukashenka and Flag Courtesy of Wikipedia

OSCE rules request that we leave assessments to the organization’s main report and remain silent.  Fortunately, in this instance, the OSCE judgement so closely corresponds to my own experience that I can refrain from my own judgments and express my own  empressions exclusively through quotations from the initial report.  That report can be found online at http://www.osce.org/item/33272.html.  Unless otherwise noted, the quotations reflect my own personal experience.

The Scope Of The Mission:

As OSCE notes, “On Election Day, 449 observers were deployed to observe the opening of polling stations, the process of voting, the vote count, and the tabulation of the votes at DECs. This included 76 specially designated teams to observe the tabulation process.”

What Went Relatively Well: The Voting Process

The OSCE report perfectly mirrors my own experience regarding the experience of voters in the voting process:

  • “On election day, observers reported that voting was well conducted overall in those polling stations visited.”
  • “Observers generally evaluated the opening procedures as good or very good in 100 per cent of the 93 cases observed.”
  • “The voting procedures were also positively assessed by observers, with 95.4 per cent of cases evaluated as good or very good.”

With a relatively minor exception:

  • “Campaign materials were displayed inside polling stations in 3 per cent of cases.”

What Did Not Go Quite As Badly: The District Election Commission Process

Again, the OSCE report mirrors my own experience regarding the conduct of the aggregation of the count at the district level:

  • “While some opposition candidates claimed to have been the subject of pressure on the part of local administrations, other candidates, including from the opposition, declared that the attitude of DECs was friendlier and more open than in the past and that the pre-election climate was improved.”

Nevertheless, as the OSCE reports,

  • “In 54 per cent of tabulations observed, they were not able to observe the figures being entered into the spreadsheet tables.”

What Went Badly:  The Counting Process

As the OSCE report concludes, “Voting was generally well conducted, but the process deteriorated considerably during the vote count. Promises to ensure transparency of the vote count were not implemented….” The process deteriorated considerably during the count and tabulation, violating paragraph 7.4 of the Copenhagen commitments of the OSCE.

  • “The integrity of the process was undermined by the vote count which was assessed by observers as bad or very bad in 48 per cent of observations [including me]. “
  • “37 per cent of observers, including some of those who noted hindrances [i.e. including me], reported not having a full view of the vote count proceeding, thus compromising the transparency of this fundamental element of the election process.”
  • “OSCE monitors were prevented or hindered from observing the vote count in 35 per cent of cases. This compromised the transparency of this fundamental element of the election process.”
  • “In 50 per cent of cases, early votes were not compared with the number of entries in the voter lists.”
  •  “Observers could not see the voters’ mark in 53 per cent of cases.
  • “Numerous cases were noted of counting procedures taking place in complete silence with small slips of paper being passed between commission members; this significantly undermined any transparency in the count.”

Reading Between the Lines:

What to make of an election that combines relatively smooth voting and district-level counting with comprised transparency at the polling-station counting stage?  The OSCE report makes certain suggestions about the possible reasons.  These conform to my own experience.

  • “From observers comments, in some instances it was noted that there were significant discrepancies between turnout observed and the number of votes noted in PEC protocols…. A high incidence of mobile voting was noted in some cases.”
  • “Where access was possible, several cases of deliberate falsification of results were observed…. Deliberate falsification was observed in 5 cases by observers.

If, indeed, the non-transparent counting procedures reflect discrepancies, this requires an explanation of how the aforementioned discrepancies could be combined with a relatively transparent voting process.  The OSCE report offers several potential explanations that correspond to my own experience:

  • “Lack of clear detailed regulations on the printing of ballots, the number of ballots to be printed, the percentage of extra ballots, and security features”
  • “Lacking instructions on observation, each PEC was free to decide on how observation would be dealt with.”
  • “The Electoral Code does not provide any clear mechanism for securely keeping the ballot boxes after the start of early voting, nor does it provide specific regulations for enhancing the integrity of the ballot.”
  • “The lack of any official protocols to document the record of voting on each day of early voting remains a concern.  These outstanding issues allow the possibility of electoral malfeasance.”

And, perhaps most significant of all,

  • In nearly all cases in which OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers had access to such information, they reported that PECs were composed of staff from the same place of work, such as enterprises or schools. Existing hierarchical relationships seem to have been transferred to the PEC, i.e. heads or deputy heads of such work places became PEC chairpersons, with their staff as the PEC members. This further contributed to the lack of independence of individuals in the commissions…. The composition of election commissions diminished stakeholders’ confidence in the process.

Most interesting of all, is the question of why.  If, as OSCE notes, “The election took place in a strictly controlled environment with a barely visible campaign,” why should engineered discrepancies and falsifications be necessary at all?  The need to make minimum turnout requirements? The desire for overwhelming margins of victory?  Simple habit?  I will leave answers to these questions for other experts and other venues.

September 2008: Poll Comparisons

Trends and comparisons monthly report

Inside the averages are multiple polls using slightly different methods and samples.  When put together these yield a surprisingly smooth and consistent picture that is the most useful for assessing levels and trends, but it is useful to take them apart from time to time to discern any internal shifts and to assess the work of the pollsters whose efforts combine to make the overall average.

Between June and September we had one month with only one poll (July) and one with only two (August), so the most useful baseline comparison here are the first and last entries for each poll.

For Smer the story is consistent over time.  Among FOCUS respondents Smer achieved a near-record high in the June survey; among UVVM respondents the high came in the July survey and as always it was considerably higher than Smer numbers in the other surveys. We do not have MVK for this period but Smer almost invariably polls lower for MVK (nearer to FOCUS-levels) than for UVVM.  Over time UVVM numbers show stability around 46%, while FOCUS shows a decline from around 44% to around 39% and MVK shows a rise from 39% to 41%, meaning that the overall shift is slightly downward.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +Smer+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

The SDKU graph is rather striking and shows an unusual pattern: near unanimous agreement between the three pollsters in June and August followed by almost the same mean in September composed of divergent estimates (FOCUS, as usual on the high side, UVVM as usual on the low side and MVK, as usual (for both SDKU and Smer) near the mean.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SDKU+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

Results for SNS show a shocking degree of consistenc.  All three polls remained within a single point and showed the exact same pattern: a rise between June and August followed by a decline below June levels in September.  This kind of univocality is really quite.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SNS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

But just when the polls were looking consistent, results for MK give us reason for taking any estimate with a large grain of salt:  Of all parties it is the Hungarian Party’s almost exclusively ethnic base that should yield the most consistent answers and yet UVVM numbers for September tend to wander around more than for other, non-ethnic parties, this month dropping below 7%.  This is highly unlikely and appears to reflect a long-term problem on the part of UVVM to get the ethnic samples consistent.  The Hungarian ethnic population is stable, and the overall averages for MK are quite stable (though showing a long term pattern of decline) so MK’s numbers should be relatively stable as well and for UVVM they simply are not.  This, of course, raises questions about how other sampling questions could be affecting other parties’ results (for any of the polls, not just UVVM) and suggests the importance of looking at multiple polls.  As it is averaged here, MK remains stable at just above 9%.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +MK+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

Similar problems emerge with regard to HZDS.  All three polls agreed on a level of 8%-9% in June but have since diverged, with FOCUS and UVVM show a drop to around 7% while UVVM alone shows a rise to arund11%.  This is a divergence of nearly 50% on an average support of 8% and something is clearly wrong here.  It is not clear what, but a facile decision by majority rule suggests that the problem may lie with HZDS.  Given the inconsistencies, it would not be surprising to see the party’s preferences in the UVVM survey fall back to around 9% in October.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +HZDS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

With KDH there is simply not much to say.  As with SNS, the polls tend to agree and show the same patterns over time.  Here, however, the pattern is absolute stability around 9%. This is what one would expect of a “demographic” population rather than the variations in MK seen above.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +KDH+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

For the smaller parties it is always more difficult to gauge, but KSS remains stable around 2% (FOCUS and UVVM show a slight overall rise, MVK shows a drop, but the June MVK number was a recent-record-high for MVK and may have been an outlier in the first place.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +KSS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

SF, too, hovers around 2%, and from June to September shows almost no change in any of the three polls, though they disagree among themselves whether the party is closer to 1% (UVVM) or 3% (FOCUS)

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SF+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

There are some issues that I realize I am not dealing with in these analyses, particularly support for the Green Party (SZ) which is included in the questioner list only by MVK, and the question of non-voters, which is worthy of attention and should become a topic of future monthly and quarterly graphs.

September 2008: Poll Averages

Overall Monthly Report

Both FOCUS and MVK released their numbers in the last 48 hours, and while it is difficult to talk about bad news for a coalition with over 60% of the likely vote, September was not a particularly good month.

As the overall graph below shows, Smer dropped slightly from its plateau, though it still remains well above past plateaus and shows a slightly upward trendline over the past 2 years. The bigger changes came within SNS, which posted its biggest monthly drop in years, down to just above 10%. There are also some questions about HZDS’s slight gain that I will deal with in the next post (the party’s gains in the UVVM survey are sharply at odds with its losses in FOCUS and MVK surveys.)

2:||||||||||||||||||||||||

For the current opposition, there was no particularly encouraging news but SDKU did turn up slightly after nearly a year of downward trend (of course it has turned up slightly in other months during the overall decline) and both the Christian Democrats and the Hungarian Coalition remained stable, as has been their habit.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +all+parties+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

The overall news is therefore reversion toward the two year mean for both coalition (dropping to just over 60%) and opposition (rising above 30%). The remaining 9% or so remains divided among parties across the party spectrum and both Slobdne Forum and the Communist Party posted slight gains this month but remain at the 2% mark. HZD and ANO, not pictured here, face an even less hopeful prospect, with numbers around 1% and perfectly flat trendlines.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +coalition+support for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

Within the framework of (rather artificial) party blocs, these changes put the parties of the “Right” ahead of the “Slovak National” bloc, which has fallen by this standard to its lowest level ever (which is not to say that “Slovak National” ideas are at their lowest ebb since these have clearly been incorporated into the rhetoric of Smer.
Multiple-poll+average+ for +party+blocs+ for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

Multiple-poll+average+ for +party+blocs+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

In terms of the overall consequences for electoral politics, the report of these results remains a broken record: Smer remains in a strong position to chose a single party as its post-election coalition partner.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +1+month+ in Slovakia

Multiple-poll+average+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

As always, the actual polling numbers are available online at Google Docs:
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=pdhlCClsiyAMi39bLFpY_Zg

And the most recent three months are below in tabular format (using “iframe” which may not work on all browsers).

<br />

August 2008: Poll Comparisons

Trends and comparisons monthly report

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10FOCUS numbers for August are in and I include them below.  In general the monthly numbers are either unsurprising and when they /are/ surprising it is tempting to dismiss them as somehow exceptional.  Notable this time is the average for UVVM and FOCUS which suggests that the midsummer rise for Smer might have been real (both polls show the same pattern) but that it was also temporary.  August numbers for Smer are back down to the high end of Smer’s normal range.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +Smer+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } The same numbers suggest that July’s remarkably poor performance for SDKU may have been a blip rather than a genuine change since numbers for both polls in August are back almost exactly to where they were in June.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SDKU+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } There has been much higher consistency among polls for SNS preferences and these show a recovery from a downward trend back to the party’s normal range (since the 2006 elections) between 12 and 13.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SNS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } Polls for MK are back in synch, close together near the party’s 2008 average of 9%.  It is notable, however, that this is a full point lower than the party’s 2006 average which, for a party with such an exclusively ethnic base, suggests either the departure of non-Hungarian supporters (unlikely since there were never that many) or a loss in the party’s ability to mobilize its own ethnic base (likely the result of Csaky’s replacement of Bugar, though the long-term numbers do not show any sharp drop in the party’s support around the time that Csaky took charge.)

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } Multiple-poll+average+ for +MK+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } In August, HZDS polls move from a period of tight convergence to a month of wide variation.  UVVM numbers are at the high end of the party’s 2008 average; FOCUS numbers are at the low end and are, in fact, the lowest level of preference the party has ever received in a major poll.  This may be a blip but the frequency of “record lows” for the party bodes ill.  Nevertheless, even with this data point included, the 1 and 2 year trendlines based on average data still put the party above the 5% threshold in mid-2010 (between 6.0 and 6.8).

Multiple-poll+average+ for +HZDS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } KDH has shown fairly wide variation in FOCUS polls but its trendline has remained essentially flat; in UVVM polls, however the party has shown a remarkably consistent climb from its early-2008 low to a level that is at least a point above its 2006 performance.  This recovery may reflect KDH’s own internal recovery from the early-year turmoil related to the departure of Palko and Miklosko coupled with a lack of similar recovery within SDKU, whose members may be shifting to their next-best alternative.Multiple-poll+average+ for +KDH+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } Between parties above and parties below the 5% threshold we still see a big gap.  HZDS’s decline, pushing its average below the 8% mark, has been matched a decline in KSS, its averages falling below the 2% mark for only the second time since 2006, so the gap between smallest-big party and biggest-small party is still 6%.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +KSS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

BODY { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } P { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } DIV { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } TD { FONT-FAMILY:Verdana; FONT-SIZE:10pt } Among the other parties, SF stays stuck around 1% (despite its small advertising blitz of the summer which did seem to net a few preferences, at least in the FOCUS and MVK polls), HZD has shown a slight rise, perhaps the result of more presidential campaigning by Gasparovic, but still has not cracked 2.5% in any poll since 2006.  ANO no longer figures at all, consistently pulling a smaller percentage of the population than those who believe they have been abducted by aliens, with a flat trend at 0.5%.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SF+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

As always, the actual polling numbers are available online at Google Docs:
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=pdhlCClsiyAMi39bLFpY_Zg
And the most recent three months are below in tabular format (using “iframe” which may not work on all browsers).

<br />

Two-thirds Rule

A brief note here to comment on one specific element of Robert Fico’s press conference remarks here regarding contracts received by those close to Smer: “the government coalition will not allow discrimination against two-thirds of the population only because they sympathize with the government party.” (see below in red).

This is notable for several reasons,

  • first because it is a nice example of the power of the current coalition’s public opinion position as political argument (popularity here becomes a justification for actions) and, within that framework, of a particular interpretation of public opinion.  It is certainly fair to say that 2/3 of Slovakia’s current voters support Smer, HZDS or SNS, but to the extent that in any given poll about 30% of voters do not support any party.  Of course this is ordinary political use of numbers and nothing particularly unusual or scandalous.
  • Second, and I noticed the artfulness only in translating and transcribing, there is the notion of government refusing to permit discrimination.  This is a common argument, but it is distinctive here because the prime minister is arguing that he will not permit discrimination against his own supporters.  The powerful subtext here, and what allows this to work despite the fact that in the same sentence he notes that he and his coalition partners have a clear supermajority in public opinion, is the spectre of dominant forces other than 2/3 the people who seek to do them harm.  I have been noting for some time how well Fico has maintained his anti-establishment position despite having almost sole control of the strongest party (and coalition) in Slovakia’s postcommunist history.  Whether he can keep this up is another question (and I have consistently been wrong in predicting that he couldn’t, but that is a question for another post).  The key appears to be his ability to persuade others (perhaps because he believes it to be true) that others (media, the former opposition, the United States, foreign investors) are the ones shaping Slovakia’s destiny.  Balancing that appeal to weakness with appeals to his own efficacy requires a delicate sense of balance.  So far he has proven himself a master.

Nedovolíme diskrimináciu ľudí len preto, že nás podporujú, odkázal médiám Fico

22. augusta 2008  16:28
Premiér Robert Fico sa znovu zastal ministerky práce Viery Tomanovej, ktorá čelí kritike za sporné štátne dotácie ľuďom blízkym jeho strane Smer-SD. Premiér zdôraznil, že nezákonné postupy alebo predražené tendre bude trestať, zároveň však je podľa neho prirodzené, ak sa predstavitelia vlády snažia v súlade so zákonom podporiť obce a mestá, ktoré vedú zástupcovia vládnych strán.

Predseda vlády Robert Fico počas tlačovej besedy, na ktorej oznámil, že vládna koalícia nedovolí diskrimináciu dvoch tretín obyvateľov len preto, že sympatizujú s vládnymi stranami.
Predseda vlády Robert Fico počas tlačovej besedy, na ktorej oznámil, že vládna koalícia nedovolí diskrimináciu dvoch tretín obyvateľov len preto, že sympatizujú s vládnymi stranami.

(autor: SITA)

Vládna koalícia nedovolí diskrimináciu dvoch tretín obyvateľov len preto, že sympatizujú s vládnymi stranami, vyhlásil premiér na brífingu, po ktorom nepripustil žiadne otázky. Predseda vlády chcel len novinárom ukázať prípady “straníckeho klientelizmu” vo fungovaní americkej demokracie a aj tak ich presvedčiť, že za dotáciami svojim nie je nič nemorálne.

Kritiku za podporu sociálnych podnikov v oblastiach s vysokou nezamestnanosťou považuje za zvrhlú. Zároveň oznámil, že už viac nebude reagovať na mediálne útoky a rôzne pseudokauzy, ako boli sociálne podniky či verejné obstarávania. “Vy nemôžete nahradiť Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie,” povedal médiám.

Fico: Nenecháme sa terorizovať médiami

Zdroj: SITA • 5,14 MB • zaznamenané: 22. 8. 2008

Ministerstvo práce podľa tlače pridelilo spolu asi 500 miliónov korún (16,6 milióna eur) na budovanie takzvaných sociálnych podnikov spoločnostiam, s ktorými sú spojení poslanci a členovia premiérovej strany. Tomanová (Smer-SD) však nedávno odmietla úvahy, že žiadatelia ťažili so svojich kontaktov s najsilnejšou vládnou stranou. Sociálne podniky by mali pomáhať znižovať nezamestnanosť. Určené sú napríklad pre ľudí, ktorí sú bez práce dlhodobo.

“Nebudeme považovať za neprípustné, ak napríklad v prípade dvoch rovnocenných projektov s rovnakou kvalitou a rovnakým výsledným efektom člen vlády uprednostní starostu či primátora za vládnu koalíciu,” vyhlásil Fico. Podmienkou podľa neho však je, aby nebol porušený zákon.

Ministerka Tomanová už v minulosti čelila výhradám za vyplatenie štátnej podpory Centru privátnych sociálnych služieb Privilégium napriek tomu, že na ňu nemalo nárok. Za sporné dotácie z verejných zdrojov nedávno musel na žiadosť premiéra odísť Jaroslav Izák (SNS) z postu ministra životného prostredia. Predražené tendre zas stáli miesto ministra obrany Františka Kašického zo Smeru-SD.

Nedovolíme diskrimináciu ľudí len preto, že nás podporujú, odkázal médiám Fico – Pravda.sk – Flock

Small (and getting smaller) parties

In a previous post I noted a growing gap between parties above the threshold of electability and those below, one that was unusual by Slovakia’s standards.  Thanks to the generosity of UVVM, FOCUS and IVO, which opened various archives to me during my time in Slovakia, I can now show a much longer time series (though numbers before 1999 are sketchier than those after because of a relative dearth of polls and less systematic methods of reporting.

Here is the development of the gap over time between the smallest “viable” party (i.e. one with more than 5%) and the largest “non-viable” party (i.e. one with less than 5%):

Viability gap in Slovakia, 1990-2008

Something is clearly changing.  With the exception of a few surveys in 1999 (like the result of the temporary consolidation of small parties into the Slovak Democratic Coalition) there were very few gaps larger than 5% from Slovakia’s first election in 1990 until its most recent in 2006 (in fact only one in twenty polls during that period showed such a large gap) whereas since 2006 there are almost no gaps smaller than 5% (only about one in ten).  In fact the band around the threshold of viability now utterly empty: since the 2006 election not a single party has had a monthly polling average in the range between 3.3% and 7.2%. Not one.

As might be expected, the gap has meant a sharp reduction in the overall share of preferences received by small parties.  The graph below shows the same trend.

Sum of Preferences for Small Parties in Slovakia

Small parties used to collect about 10%-20% but this is no longer the case.  The total number of preferences for parties below the 5% threshold in August 2008 was 4.2%. Put in other words, even if all the supporters for obscure parties banded together (not very likely), they would not together have enough to cross the threshold. Between the 1990 and 2006 elections only 17 of the 161 months with surveys showed a sum below 5%; since the 2006 elections only 1 of the 26 months shows a sum above 5%.

There is no single clear explanation for this change but there are several reasons that might make sense:

  • Smer and SDKU have “mopped up” several of the smaller parties (and the re-unification of SNS helped in this direction as well).
  • Voters have finally decided that they do not want to “waste” their votes on small parties (though of course “waste” is a contentious term in itself since there are reasons to vote for parties that have nothing to do with those parties’ chances for election to parliament).  Evidence from recent IVO surveys shows that voters think consciously about the support received by the party they intend to vote for and are less likely to vote for a party that might not get elected (preferring to give their votes to an electable second choice).  Unfortunately we do not have older data on this and cannot easily perform a time series.
  • Media and financial structures have come to play such a strong role in party choice that small parties which cannot get media attention or financial sponsorship cannot attract meaningful support and drop from the public radar screen.

The current “all-or-nothing” pattern of party support does not mean that there is no chance for new parties, but it does suggest that it is even more difficult for a party to to climb its way up from below as KSS did in 2002.  As before, new parties will need to drop in from above as big splinters of even bigger parties with dissatisfied electorates (DU, and to some extent ZRS and Smer) or as saviors (Smer, ANO, SOP).

Back from outer space (and/or Finland)

But still in the stratosphere (and/or Ferndale).

July

A virtually computer-free vacation meant no July poll analysis. There is one (and really only one) sense in which this is unfortunate: July polls showed something I have never seen before in Slovakia, a one-party parliamentary majority.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +1+month+ in Slovakia

In the UVVM July survey, Smer polled 48.5% which, after factoring out all the parties below the five-percent threshold (see the next post on small parties) gives the party just over 50% of all supporters of electable parties and, thanks to some slightly favorable electoral-system math, one vote more than half.%C2%A0 Whether or not the party sustains this level of support, the instance itself is notable because it is unprecedented: 48.5% of voters expressing a party preference, 76 seats, 4.2 times as many as the next largest party, 5 times as many as the next largest opposition party.

August

So far all we have for July or August are the UVVM polls so I will use the restricted comparison set here. The August UVVM polls put Smer back down to 44.9% which is still at the high end of its previous “normal” range, with “only” 3.5 times as many supporters as the next largest party (once again the opposition party SDKU).

UVVM+poll+data+ for +all+parties+ for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

The same “return to normal” is apparent for the smaller parties (and compared to Smer,
every party is a smaller party). July’s record high for Smer was accompanied by a post-election record low for SDKU (9.7%, in percentage terms an even bigger shift from the average than Smer’s high-water mark) but August returns the party to the (low side of the) 11%-15% range where it has been since the election. Since SNS has showed a steady climb back from its poor showings in May and June, this again leaves us with the 3-track pattern of party support–Smer around 40, SDKU and SNS around 13 and HZDS, MK and KDH around 9–that dominated the first half of 2008. Indeed, August 2008 is virtually identical to February 2008, with no party’s results differing by even a full percentage point from 7 months ago and overall volatility between those two months at a shockingly low 1.5%. Of course we are not back in February–a lot has happened since then–but the long-term stability is striking.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +all+parties+except+Smer+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

Though the shifts mean that this month is not as propitious for the current coalition as last month, it is still near its overall high point in the post-election period…
UVVM+poll+data+ for +coalition+support for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

…a second graph shows that the gains have been mostly for Smer and show a slight declining trend for the both the “Slovak national” and “right” parties (their current recovery takes them back only to a point that would have been considered low for much of 2007 and 2008.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +party+'blocs'+ for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

As for parliament, the August figures again correspond with the likely “real world” consideration that were elections held today Smer would require one (and only one) coalition partner.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +1+month+ in Slovakia

UVVM+poll+data+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

We will need to wait for figures from FOCUS or MVK to make a better assessment of whether UVVM’s trends show echoes elsewhere or whether July was an anomaly, though given the erratic change, I bet on the anomaly.

As always, the actual polling numbers are available online at Google Docs:
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=pdhlCClsiyAMi39bLFpY_Zg

And the most recent three months are below in tabular format (using “iframe” which may not work on all browsers).

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