Category: Slovakia

Discussion in Bratislava: Populism in Postcommunist Europe

Join us for a discussion of

Populism in

.

Postcommunist

.

Europe

* What is it?
* How should we study it?
* Why should we care?

With political science scholars who study politics in postcommunist Europe, especially in Slovakia and Poland

  • Kevin Deegan-Krause, Department of Political Science, Wayne State University, USA
  • Ann-Cathrine Jungar, CBEES (Centre for Baltic and East European Studies)
    Södertörns högskola/University College Stockholm, Sweden
  • David Ost, Department of Political Science, Hobart and Smith Colleges, USA
  • Ben Stanley, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK
  • Peter Učeň, Department of Political Science, Comenius University, Slovaki

The discussion will take place in English

Where:
Slovak Foreign Policy Association Library, Hviezdoslavovo nám. 14 Bratislava
(Csákyho palác, 2nd floor, number 22, tel. +421 2 5443 3151)

When:
Monday, 23 June 2008 at 15.30

Slovakia’s Politics in a Nutshell

On May 11 I had the rare pleasure of talking about Slovakia’s politics at the Cafe Roland in Bratislava’s main square with an audience that actually (unlike my students) had some choice about whether to attend. I am grateful to the audience for their questions and their tolerance for what was (in the end) too much talking on my part. I promised at the time to post the powerpoint but on reading it realized that to make sense it would require considerable annotation. That is what I have (finally) done and it’s now online here:

http://www.pozorblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/oversize/Slovakia’s Politics in a Nutshell 2008 Annotated.ppt

As always, I’m interested in comments and questions.

Conference Notes: Social Democracy after the 2006 Elections in Slovakia

Thanks to Michael Petras and Martin Muransky for organizing a fabulous conference:Below please find a few notes from various speakers and at the bottom, the conference schedule in Slovak.

Social Democracy after the 2006 Elections in Slovakia

Bratislava, Slovakia, 23-24 May 2008
Organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Social Policy of the Slovak GovernmentJuraj Draxler, Center for European Policy Studies Brusel

Basis of social protection

Correcting for demographics and unemployment, Slovak averages considerably below the Czech Republic and Hungary and even below Poland.

What does this really mean? What is a social state? As viewed in the media, it is “redistribution,” it is “charity.” It also serves other important purposes:

  • Minimize externalities
  • Solve social problems
  • Smooth out economic cycle

When formed it was not just an altruistic effort but also supported by the entrepreneurial sector. In Scandinavia it is extended to system of minimizing risks for individuals, hence large emphasis on unemployment insurance.

Economic background

Slovakia is exceptionally dependent on international market, exceptionally open. We cannot talk about endogenous growth but about influence from abroad. Employment (2004) is to a larger degree than in UK and Germany in small firms. Economic value, on the other hand, is in the larger firms. Slovakia profits from productivity of big firms Small expenditure on research. Natural emphasis on rapid adaptation to western maket. There is a lack of experience that the state has a role in minimizing risk. There is a large population of long-term unemployed.

Not in a typical “industrial state” in which workers spend entire lives in one firm. Now there is an expectation (requirement) of far greater flexibility. Currently there is a big debate related to working with “znalost,” knowledge workers.

Experience of long-term unemployed in UK suggests that this is becomes a culture question which, once created, is difficult to eradicate.

Who creates social policy in Slovakia.

  • Unions? In West, unions play a role, classic tripartite-model, whereas in Slovakia this is not the case. Every kind of activity—strikes, organization—is lower than in the West.
  • Electorate? Only through parties
  • Governing parties? Slovakia has centralized, paternalistic state. What the center decides is done. This can have some advantage: only one system, easy to change. But because so centralized, system is dependent on government/parties that are in charge.

Places of conflict?

  • Negotiations of interest groups
  • Public debates
  • Technical/Technocratic debates.

Smer’s Voters: A Sociological PortraitOľga Gyarfášová, IVO a Vlado Krivý, Sociologický ústav SAV

Adherents before 2006 elections

Charts show growth in voters for “left” and center-right parties

Smer voters not distinct in their views of the direction of the countries—not overwhelmingly dissatisfied with direction of the country (more like SNS than KSS and HZDS). It is not to that extent much of a protest parties.

Value orientation does not look overwhelmingly different from average (slightly more opposed to reform and church but not much else).

Left from a socioeconomic perspective but lacks anything else.

On left-right axis slightly greater in weak left and weaker in weak right on self-declared. On latent (ascribed values) almost identical to population as a whole.

Smer has shifted somewhat to the east and overwhelmingly to smaller towns, rural space.

In 2002 party did best in big (but not the biggest) cities. In 2006 party did best in smallest communities, 2nd best in 20k to 49k. Smer won lots of votes from HZDS, KSS and HZD.

Voters of Smer in 2006 and supporters in 2007

In 50 categories, Smer differed from population only in 14, 8 of which were regions. Otherwise, Smer did better only in only low education, small towns, lower occupational class, and worse only in both higher and basic education and those with lowest wages.

No clear gain from other parties (mainly from novoters, first voters, undecided) Most Smer voters stayed in Smer.

Fico second most popular individual for both SNS and HZDS (Slota is third for HZDS, Gasparovic is 3rd for Smer while Kalinak is second). Leaders have much higher value among current governing parties than among current opposition parties.

Comparative study suggests that slovakia has smaller right and larger center than other countries in the region but no smaller leftand about average number of “unknowns”

Compared to other “Left” parties, Smer has lowest level of left voters. Smaller by 13 points than CSSD, by 27 points than Poland’s LiD, by 31 points than MSZD and by 15 points than SZDSZ.

National left and right are closer to each other than to similar parties from other countries. National context is more important than ideological one [though if reduced to a single axis, with “abortion” removed, this effect disappears.]

Oponent – Pavol Marchevský, UVVM

Researchers must work with the work they have.

4 Points relevant to the presentation

  1. Value orientation of Smer, most mainstream (visible in publications as well)
  2. Difference between self-declared and latent values. In self-declared, most are center. In “real terms” they are much more to the left”
  3. Smer—party that got 29 percent in election now has 43. First time voters support them overwhelming. National values are more important than economic values in shaping left and right
  4. Lacks a time-perspective. Need to use long time-series. Qualitative change. Structure of the electorate shifted toward different kinds of voters [more disciplined ones]. Before the 2002 elections, Smer had only 4 among the oldest voters (the ones who go and vote). In January 2006 they had 25 percent, and those voters go and vote. Notion is that Smer is general without army, and that Smer would get 1/3 less than before. But UVVM knew that Smer really had the voters. Already 1 year after creation, Smer had 20, by a year before 2006 had 40. But the voters earlier were less disciplined, diametrically opposed. Now Smer has numbers over 40 percent. (Means in practice that university educated still prefer Smer 2-1)

Social weakest are voters of KSS and HZDS more than Smer. They also do not go and vote.

The National Pillar in the Politics of SmerPavel Hynčica, Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Jana Evangelisty Purkyně v Ústí nad Labem

More unites Smer a SNS than divides them.

National appeals in the party Smer. Increase of national appeals has its deeper roots.

Early in the party’s existence a variety of efforts about Roma, made party closer to the SNS. After election 2002 the left-right scale strengthened. Profiled mainly on socioeconomic lines. Reflected in support for HZD candidate Gasparovic in presidence and cooperation in elections.

Oponent – Peter Weiss, Ekonomická univerzita Bratislava

One problem, perhaps basically, comparison of program shows difference. But must compare to other parties. Other parties, too, show that their programs are similar, including also KDH. Must look at other parties—HZDS, KDH and compare also to those other parties. Must look especially to HZDS for comparision.

Must look also at “HSLS” history and role it plays in current parties.

Must look also at position of Smer toward Tiso, toward Holocaust which is quite different from SNS.

Dislikes Smer’s approval of Hlinka as father of the nation which undermined leftism of party (whether for genuine or “marketing” reasons.

Problem of immigration and “different” social groups could become an issue, even if it is not yet. This would strengthen conservatism in Slovakia.

After its founding in 1999, Smer proved capable of getting not only voters of SDL but those of HZDS; without national appeals it couldn’t have done it.

Populist Appeals in Slovakia’s PoliticsKevin Deegan-Krause, Department of Political Science, Wayne State University

Please contact me for the full text. I will try to post it soon.

Thanks to all of the participants for their great questions. Here’s a rough summary.

Questions:

  • Is it licit to treat parties as unitary actors, particularly SDK and MK before 1998. These parties are really multiple actors?
  • Does the ‘dominant position of the leader’ really belong within concepts of populism. Is it necessary? Personalization and ‘presidentialization’ seem to be the common trend these days.
  • Should all of these elements have equal weight in the creation of the scale?
  • Can the
  • What is the role of the media in this? Do they play an independent role?
  • To what extent did Smer set out to build a social democratic party or to what extent did they set out to build an electorally successful party and later opted for social democracy as the key to that success?
  • What explains the rise of populist appeal scores for SNS?
  • Many of the parties in Slovakia’s governments have been new parties with highly populist appeals that then die off: ZRS, SOP, ANO. To what extent will we expect such a pattern to contrinue?
  • Shouldn’t features such as “making promises that cannot be fulfilled” and “close following of public opinion, popular preferences” be included as elements of populism?
  • Is there a long term “populist type” of voter, somebody who regularly votes for new parties? Does this mean a long-term populist issue divide?

Economic Policy in Slovakia and its Impacts—Comparison with the V4
Zdeněk Lukáš, Wiener Institut fuer Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche
What do the V4 have in common

  • Average incomes
  • Average wage levels
  • Overall price levels

Fully in line with lower degree of development and therefore lower labor productivity

Low in comparison to V4 but rapidly catching up

Incomes PPP

  • CZ from 69 in 2002 to 81 in 2007
  • SK from 51 in 2002 to 69 in 2007
  • HU from 54 in 2000 to 61 in 2007
  • PL from 48 in 2007 to 54 in 2007

Wages in EUR

  • CZ from 400 in 2002 to 800 in 2007
  • SK from 270 in 2002 to 600 in 2007
  • HU from 300 in 2000 to 700 in 2007
  • PL from 480 in 2007 to 700 in 2007
  • Austria, for comparison form 2390 in 2000 to 2762 in 2007

Slovakia remains very attractive for foreign investors

Price level compared to EU

  • CZ from 40 in 2002 to 60 in 2007
  • SK from 40 in 2002 to 60 in 2007
  • HU from 45 in 2000 to 60 in 2007
  • PL from 45 in 2007 to 60 in 2007

Difference is still marked

Also in common—improving trade balance in spite of catching up of wages and prices

Not quite in common: Improving financial balances. CZ, SK and PL all in balance, Hungary far below.

Other policy features in common: emphasis on attracting foreign direct investment, priority of reforms on social security

Admiration for Anglo-Saxon/Hayekian approaches

Heading for Slim states

  • CZ from 55 in 2002 to 47% in 2007
  • SK from 48 in 2002 to 50% in 2007
  • HU from 53 in 2000 to 47% in 2007
  • PL from 47 in 2007 to 38% in 2007 (major difference coming in around 2003)
  • EU 15 average is 46.2%

What are the differences

Average income

Discrepancy between rich and poor (social inclusion and exclusion: periphery and poverty). Bratislava v. far eastern sections

Problems with transport net but in respect to the west, is functional

Reform radicalism—more in some countries than in others

Influence of populism—not much seen in Slovakia between 1998-2006

Ideas about the role of the EU—Euroskeptics in CZ (now) and (until recently) PL

Lessons

  • In the end the V4 transition was a success thanks to exchange rates which secured competitiveness
  • Within the EU there is plenty of space for economic success or poor performance, e.g. Ireland vs. Greece, Sweden v. Italy, Slovakia vs. Hungary and plenty of space for good and bad policies
    • Slovakia has success in part because of Fico’s continuation of Dzurinda’s economic course. It would have been difficult to do anything differently since this was the locomotive of current growth. If Dzurinda government had continued after 2006, it would have engaged in the same generous social policy as Fico because it finally would have had the means.
  • Some V4 experiences contradictory to rule that low interest rates provokes inflation

Slovakia’s economy, now and later

  • Slovakia remains an attractive location for foreign investment
  • Could overheating push prices and wages too high, create labor market shortage in some segments? (probably has not been a major problem with inflation, because of greater increases in productivity than wages)
  • 10.4% growth plus 2.8% inflation is remarkable and raises concerns about future in inflation, particularly in goods and services for those with below-average income.
    • In Slovakia there is a major competition in supermarkets and similar stores unlike, for example, Slovenia, which should keep some Euro risks lower.
  • For country with 10.$ growth, budget deficit was rather high (2.2% of GNP). This does not look alarming in light of relatively low government debt (29.4%)

Will government have sufficient funds, even if lower GDP growth

Key tasks:

  • Upgrading educational system (a key for future success)
  • Upgrading infrastructure (a key for future success)
  • Fight against impoverishment and social exclusion)
  • EU cofinancing requires domestic resources and skills

Questions from the audience

  • What explains the sharp drop in government expenditure in Slovakia in 2003? Growth in the economy? Drop in generosity of social benefits? What is the state of productivity?
  • Productivity of work has regularly (though not always) exceeded rise in prices.
  • Spain is an interesting case for comparison in regard to “approximation”
  • Can you compare foreign investment between the Czech and Slovak direct foreign investment? Is not it greater in the Czech Republic ? Does the investment have to do with reforms or with cheaper but still qualified workers?
  • Can you talk about automobile industry. Is not making the greatest number of cars per capita about like making the greatest number of tanks per capital. How much time do we have for the next transformation of industrial production?

Party Smer: Populist or Just Popular?
Karen Henderson, University of Leicester -I do not want to do deep analyses of populism or Smer’s program, but rather about how populism became part of Slovak political competition.

Noteworthy in the press that the expression “populism” is used against Smer by every party. If even SNS and HZDS use it then it can only mean “enemy.”

Two parts. First part will analyze use of ‘terminus technicus’ “populist” and “popular” and in the second part I will focus on the fact that the term populism hides more than it reveals. It hides the ‘social democratic’ side of the party Smer. Opposition parties use ‘populist” in order not to deal with the fact that they are not popular.

Populism has a sufficiently brief definition: ideology which sees society as divided into 2 homogenous groups: a pure people and a corrupt elite. They say that “the elites are corrupt. We need better politicians. Need to trade in current elites for somebody new. ”

Most of the new parties created anew since 1990 have been marked as ‘new’ party. In this sense, populism is simply a political strategy for getting elected and one with a relatively short lifespan once parties get into power. There is the claim that reject complexity, prefer simplicity.

In Slovakia in the last 20 years only 2 politicians have asked “what do voters want” and tried to give it. That is why they get labeled as populist. In many cases this /is/ a problem (majority of Slovaks favor the death penalty). But, political discourse in Slovakia which marks Smer as populist is problematic. On one hand, people criticize Smer as populist; on they other hand they criticize it for not fulfilling its social promises. (The discourse is complicated by the fact that )

One definition suggests that populists have an aversion to representative democracy and prefer direct democracy. Interesting that Dzurinda criticized Fico as populist when both (quietly) cooperated in shifting the argument to economics (right v. left) and then criticized Fico as a populist.

Very typical for leftist parties in Central Europe to have leftist economic position and conservative cultural position.

The hidden question of Slovakia’s current debate is that the current opposition has been incapable of appealing to voters, to figuring out what they want?

Mudde talks about the “populist zeitgeist.” Are politicians today more corrupt than they were before? Maybe there are always new populist parties in Slovakia because the politicians really are corrupted. Everybody thinks that politicians take those positions in order to distribute state property to those close to them. Every government party attacks every other as corrupt.

Oponent – Petr Učeň, doktorand na Katedre politológie UK
Karen says that it is important to distinguish between populism and popularity. Peter Levin wrote: “why is there so much discussion of populism in Europe when similar American politicians are regarded as mainstream.”

Karen talks about “eastern” form of social democracy where political leftism is not combined with liberal cultural values and that Smer started as populist but has ended up somewhere else.

It is a populist project which survived, which selectively adopted a leftist economic agenda, and also a social conservative agenda to the extent that it would help the party. Karen says that Smer is a programmatic party. In at least relaxed version, programmatic party is one that refers to its program, and by those standards, Smer is programmatic, but they realize the problems in implementing their program and have preferred to engage in symbols (even if relatively strong ones) such as Christmas gifts for retirees.

Content-based approach at finding core of populism does not lead anywhere. Laclaou: “every discussion of populism leads to an “avalanche of exceptions”

Is populism an ideology or an electoral strategy. Frieden argues that “ideology” is a map of politics, a way of interpret politics. By those standards, populism is an ideology but it is a “thin” (stihla) one. It only talks about one thing. People are not where they should be, politically, and that must change. Populism talks about 4 basic things: political structure divided, fatally antagonist, moral apologetics for public influence on politics. Populism needs, therefore, a compound. It needs to be joined with something else. It is an “adjective” rather than a noun.

Kalinak, Paska are not populists. They can help their leaders but this is not their primary skill.

Interesting that Fico continues to succeed in using anti-establishment rhetoric despite the fact that he is in the elite.

Program odbornej konferencie

 

„Sociálna demokracia po voľbách 2006 na Slovensku“

Piatok 23.5.2008

13,00 – zahájenie Michael Petráš, FES, moderovanie Darina Malová

– Sociálna politika slovenskej vlády

Juraj Draxler, Center for European Policy Studies Brusel

diskusia

14,00 -Voliči Smeru – sociologický portrét

Oľga Gyarfášová, IVO a Vlado Krivý, Sociologický ústav SAV
Oponent – Pavol Marchevský, UVVM

diskusia

15,15 – prestávka

15,45 – Národní pilíř v politice SMERu

Pavel Hynčica, Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Jana Evangelisty Purkyně v Ústí nad
Labem
Oponent – Peter Weiss, Ekonomická univerzita Bratislava

diskusia

17,00 – Smer v komparatívnej perspektíve európskych politických strán

Kevin Deegan-Krause, Wayne State University
Oponent – Lubomír Kopeček, Masarykova universita Brno

diskusia

cca 18,30 – recepcia, spoločné neformálne posedenie

Sobota 24.5.2008

09,00 moderovanie Oľga Gyarfášová

Hospodářska politika na Slovensku a její dopady – komparace s V4
Zdeněk Lukáš, Wiener Institut fuer Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche

diskusia

10,00 – SMER: od pragmatizmu k sociálnej demokracii

Luboš Bláha, Politologický kabinet SAV a Robert Žanony
Oponent – Peter Horváth, UCM Trnava

diskusia

11,15 – prestávka

11,45 – Strana Smer-SD – populistická alebo populárna?

Karen Henderson, University of Leicester –
Oponent – P. Učeň, doktorand na Katedre politológie UK

diskusia

cca 13,30 – záver a spoločný obed

April 2008: Poll Averages

Overall Monthly Report

FOCUS has just released its March and April numbers and as usual, not much has changed. Indeed the sheer absence of change makes me note (and regret) that I mentioned about an absence of change even in months with much bigger jumps. Though the various polls show some change (as this weekend’s post on poll comparisons should show), these average out to almost nothing.

2:|||2006||||||||||||2007|||||||||

As the bands above and below show, the “4 band” (Smer, SNS/SDKU, HZDS/SMK/KDH, all other parties) model continues. Not since November of 2006–over a year and half–has a party crossed the line from one of these groups to another. With regard to specific parties, (on which more later), it is worth noting only that HZDS has recovered from its dramatic drop earlier in the year and that despite major intra-party struggles and defections, none of the current opposition parties has seen its preferences alter in a meaningful way, suggesting, perhaps, that these parties have are relying only on their core support base, those who will not go anywhere else (except a new and compelling but otherwise programmatically identical party) no matter what happens.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +all+parties+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

If the current opposition parties have indeed fallen to their core, they can take little solace in the fact that that core gives them only 1/3 of Slovakia’s overall electorate, as the graphs below suggest.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +coalition+support for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

This long-term graph of poll results for coalition and non-coalition parties shows @@@

Multiple-poll+average+ for +coalition+support for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

The party “bloc” story is similar and actually reinforces the fact that among non-Hungarian voters, the support of the current opposition is no larger than support for the current coalition’s more nationally-oriented parties. Even if much of Smer’s currently unprecedent support consists of a large number of relatively passive voters who may change their minds before the next election, it is difficult to imagine any coalition that did not include the “left” or any coalition involving the “right” that did not involve either the “left” or parties from more than two blocs. That is not impossible to imagine–indeed it is a mainstay of Slovakia’s politics: Slovak National+Left (1992-1994, 1994-1998, 2006-) or Right+Hungarian National+Left (1994, 1998-2002)–but it underlines the exceptional nature of the 2002-2006 government (Right+Hungarian National).

Multiple-poll+average+ for +party+blocs+ for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

Multiple-poll+average+ for +party+blocs+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

Although the results meant a bit of reshuffling within opposition and coalition, the overall proportion of seats has remained highly stable in the last year (with the never-ending caveat that elections are different than polls).

Multiple-poll+average+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +1+month+ in Slovakia

Multiple-poll+average+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

As always, the actual polling numbers are available online at Google Docs:
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=pdhlCClsiyAMi39bLFpY_Zg

Below I attempt (for the first time) to insert these in tabular format (using “iframe” which may not work on all browsers).

UVVM April 2008

UVVM Monthly Report

A brief encounter between my computer and a falling hat-rack has led to a long hiatus in postings, but finally I have the processing capacity to post recent results. Not a lot of change, but enough to justify comment:

UVVM+poll+data+ for +all+parties+ for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

This overall long-term graph of poll results for UVVM shows little change in relative party positions, but this is actually rather significant given a variety of other changes that have occurred in the meantime: KDH has not lost support despite the departure of 4 key deputies; SDKU has not lost support despite bitter internal struggles; and Smer has lost support for two months running despite a series of successes at the parliamentary and policy level. Of course the changes (or the expect-able changes that didn’t happen) are relatively small and so could be obscured here by polling noise and so the next several months should help us discern the effects.

Also notable here is the recovery of HZDS from its lows at the beginning of the year, but there remains a substantial gap between the party and the next level. Whereas for many years the fortunes of parties crossed one another creating a confusing ebb and flow, for six months there have been four clear tracks, clusters of parties with no movement from one to the other: 40% (Smer), 14% (SDKU, SNS), 9% (KDH, SMK, HZDS) and 1% (everybody else, most notably KSS, SF, HZD and ANO), as the following graph shows in more detail.
UVVM+poll+data+ for +all+parties+except+Smer+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

The changes of the last two months have not had much effect on overall coalition-opposition share, however, as the following two graphs indicate.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +coalition+support for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

UVVM+poll+data+ for +coalition+support for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

To the extent that ‘blocs’ mean anything (and this is not always clear), Smer’s small drop has its counterpart in the slight rise of the right and Slovak national blocs, but this is almost imperceptible on the big graph and the ewest results take us back almost precisely to Autumn 2007.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +party+'blocs'+ for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

UVVM+poll+data+ for +party+'blocs'+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

The result is in practice the same as before: Smer can take its pick of coalition partner (though for the first time in over a year, there is a 2 party coalition that does not have a majority (the in-any-case unlikely combination of Smer and KDH). It is notable, however, that the decline led Sme to report that “Smer plus SNS have a comfortable majority” which several months ago was so clear that it did not even need reporting.

UVVM+poll+data+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +1+month+ in Slovakia

UVVM+poll+data+ for +estimated+party+seat+distribution for the most recent +24+months+ in Slovakia

Separated At Birth

Ceremonial president of former Czechoslovak republic seeks same. Must be medium height and and medium build, with grey hair cut short, and not unstylish glasses. Trimmed grey moustache and willingness to support the current governing coalition a plus.

Gasparovic vis a vis Klaus. Thanks to CTK photographer for framing the shot in such a way as to point out what should have been obvious.

It has taken 15 years, many elections and several hairstylists, but Slovakia and the Czech Republic have finally begun the process of re-convergence, beginning from the top down.  Are two countries really separate if you cannot tell them apart anymore?

February 2008: Trends and Comparisons Revised, Now with MVK!

Trends and Comparisons Monthly Report

I missed the press release for MVK earlier this month and so I add its polls here with a few comments where MVK data actually changes anything. Because MVK results tend to stand between the other two surveys, the only major changes involve a gentle smoothing of trends:

Multiple-poll+average+ for +Smer+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

With MVK added the trend for Smer between December and February is almost flat and the final average closer to 40% than to 41%, but that’s not exactly earthshaking. On all 3 occasions MVK splits the difference between UVVM and FOCUS
Multiple-poll+average+ for +SDKU+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent polling results for SDKU shows no real difference with the addition of MVK: drop and then slight recovery. MVK jumps from side to side.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SNS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

MVK slightly dampens the loss-gain patten of SNS here.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +MK+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent results for MK shows even more stability with the addition of MVK data. As before, this data suggests that perhaps UVVM was not surveying a sufficient number of ethnic Hungarians, a problem that may have been fixed in the most recent UVVM poll.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +HZDS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

Adding MVK to HZDS reveals a completely flat trend. MVK tends to show lower values for HZDS than do other polls.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +KDH+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

MVK data brings up the middle but there’s not much middle to bring up as the range is extremely narrow.
Multiple-poll+average+ for +KSS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent results for KSS shows no change because on all three occasions, the figure for KSS is the exact mathematical mean of the figures for UVVM and FOCUS.

February 2008: Trends and Comparisons

Trends and Comparisons Monthly Report

I offer here, as every month, a general and rather idiosyncratic look at poll numbers for Slovakia from rival political polling firms FOCUS and UVVM. (Toward that end, there will be a debate tonight–March 5 at 17:00–between Pavol Haulik of MVK–another of the big 3–and Ivan Dianiska from FOCUS at the Bratislavsky Institut Humanismu’s Klub BIH at Grosslingova 53). I’ll blog that if I can.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +Smer+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent polling results for Smer from multiple sources shows an overall rise for Smer by 3-5 percentage points in both of the major polls. These take it back to the highs that it reached in early 2007 before declining a bit. At present there is a strong inverse correlation between Support for Smer after the 2006 election and average monthly temperature. There is no evidence, however, that /this/ summer will bring a decline in Smer support.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SDKU+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent polling results for SDKU shows a decline that is roughly inverse to Smer’s rise, though the average of UVVM and FOCUS did not change over the last 3 months. March should tell us what the sudden visibility of leadership questions in the party have on its overall popularity. I would suspect the effect is small, and may be clouded by the effects of problems within KDH. Next month might show lots of change, or it might show no change at all in a way that hides lots of countervailing shifts in party preference.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SNS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent results for SNS shows movement without fundamental change. The party floats consistently now between 11% and 14%

Multiple-poll+average+ for +MK+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent results for MK shows why poll averaging is important: individual poll changs tend to combine to reflect the overall stability that MK possesses on the basis of its strong ethnic support.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +HZDS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent results for HZDS showsa slight recovery in both FOCUS and UVVM for February but not enough to counteract the significant decline from Nov.-Jan. in the wake of the SPF scandals.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +KDH+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent results for KDH shows gentle decline. We shall see whether the departure by Palko and Miklosoko affects the overall party performance. Loss of 2 of the 4 most popular individuals might hurt it somewhat, but it will be stabilized by the preservation of the party’s organizational base and by the fact that Palko et al did not immediately create a new party (which seems like a major tactical error, but perhaps one they could not avoid without prematurely reveailing their intentions). Supporters of Palko and Miklosko as of yet do not have anywhere else to go. It is interesting that in his recent interviews Palko has talked about a “party of patriotism” that would seek voters as much from SNS as from KDH. Whether this is realistic is an open question, though the potential erratic ebbs and flows of SNS leadership suggest that there is a tradeoff: a new party has a small change to make big gains at the expense of SNS, and a big chance to make small gains at the expense of KDH. As always, much will depend on timing.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +KSS+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

For reasons that are not entirely clear to me, both UVVM and FOCUS show a significant and similar 2-point decline for KSS over the last 4 months. I hope at some point to write a brief note about the usefulness of maintaining party brand names because of their potential to re-emerge (KSS in 2002, SNS in 2006 in Slovakia; SZ in the Czech Republic) but I’m not sure they can successfully re-emerge twice.

Multiple-poll+average+ for +SF+ for the most recent +4+months+ in Slovakia

This graph of recent results for SF shows a flat line, as do results for ANO. It will take a lot for these to re-emerge.

But enough about Slovakia…

Thanks to Michaela Stankova for her story on my research in The Slovak Spectator: http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/30859/12/far_more_than_a_research_project.html
She did a good job of transforming a rambling interview into a coherent narrative.
For those who just can’t get enough, the full interview is on our Goat Street blog: http://bridgetmail.wordpress.com/2008/03/01/why-i-am-here-more-or-less/

Exit, [Void] and Loyalty

(or why Dr. Sean hits the nail on the head)

Kudos to Sean Hanley for his recent post, Do Slovak and Czech Christian Democrats have a prayer? Dr. Hanley, whose blog (Dr. Sean’s Diary, http://drseansdiary.blogspot.com/) has long been my model for public, academc discourse on postcommunist Europe, yet again calls attention to precisely the questions I am trying to think about. Not only does he do an an excellent job of covering the dilemmas of the Christian Democrats in the Czech Republic, a realm that nobody knows better than he, but he also offers provocative thoughts about intra-party struggles, coalitions and election results in Slovakia:

And generational renewal? Commentators and politicians in CEE are always harping on about this, but it’s hard to see quite newer or younger will necessarily mean better. Such comments are, usually a disguised call for in political renewal or cleaner, better, more liberal government – amen to that, but even though there is no primaries system there is ample scope for new parties to emerge or young technocrats to parachute themselves into organizationally weak, elite-led parties. The Slovak experience suggests that many voters don’t want renewal of this kind, but stability. Is the Slovak Barack Obama actually Robert Fico?

Though the comparison may not be desirable to some partisans of Obama or of Fico, there are important similarities that must not be overlooked. I continue to wrestle with the concept of “populism” since in its common usage it is both vague and highly normative:

Populism Definition

Populism

But if populism does mean anything–and I think it does mean something despite all of the accretions over time–it is a sense that politics is broken. It is a feeling (though not quite an ideology) that those in public office–both those in power and those in opposition–are the cause of the problem. By this standard, of course, nearly every American politician is a populist, but if you compare them to many of their European counterparts, that is actually a fairly accurate characterization. While I have not done the spadework to explain why, I suspect that America’s relative exceptionalism in this regard has a lot to do with its presidential system, the dominant role of media, the relative absence of party organization. Many European countries are moving in this direction, however and postcommunist Europe appears to be in the vanguard. In this sense, both Fico and Obama have become preferred choice for those voters who are tired of “politics as usual” and who seek something different. Those are different kinds of voters compared to their overall electorates, but that is a different story.

Party renewal

There is a lot more to say about the question of populism, and I hope to do so over the coming months. In the meantime, however, I want to point out one very important difference between Obama and Fico and one that goes to the heart of Prof. Hanley’s question: Barack Obama is still a member of the Democratic Party and it is hard to imagine him leaving the party if he loses the nomination; Robert Fico, on the other hand, left his original party and formed a new one.

Fico is not alone in this. Indeed questions of internal-party change and party defection are central to the course of Slovakia’s politics and to the politics of many countries in the region. Dr. Hanley is right to point out that the question is not whether parties can achieve generational change; renewal can easily occur within a single generational cohort. Rather, the question is whether renewal can occur within a single party. Two phenomena mark Slovakia’s political party system: the relative infrequency of institutionalized leadership change and the relative frequency of party splits and splintering.

Loyalty: The Rarity of Party Leadership Change

Parties in Slovakia rarely change leaders and they almost never undergo institutionalized leadership transitions. Among Slovakia’s current parliamentary parties. As the table below shows, the average tenure of the chairmen of Slovakia’s current parliamentary parties is between 8 and 9 years (depending on the method of calculation), and this represents an average of 67%-71% of their parties’ respective lifespans.

Party Founding Date Number of leaders since founding Current leader Date assumed leadership Duration of leadership Length of leadership as % of length of party existence
Party of the Hungarian Coalition (MKP/SMK) 1990 2* Pal Csaky 2007 1 year 6%
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) 1990 2 Pavol Hrusovsky 2000 7 years 41%
Slovak National Party (SNS) 1990 5 Jan Slota 1994 9 years/13 years** 53%/76%**
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 1991 1 Vladimir Meciar 1991 16 years 100%
Smer 1999 1 Robert Fico 1999 8 years 100%
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) 2000 1 Mikulas Dzurinda 2000 7 years/9 years*** 100%
Mean scores 1993 2 – 1999 8-9 67%-71%
http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/slovakia.htm* Party formed from merger of Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (MKDM) and Coexistence in 1998
**Jan Slota rejected his removal in 1999 and formed the rival “Real” Slovak National Party (PSNS) during his period out of leadership in SNS.
***Mikulas Dzurinda led the Slovak Democratic Coalition before leading the SDKU

Indeed three parties, Smer, SDKU-DS and HZDS (which together hold almost 2/3 of the deputies in parliament), have had the same leader for their entire existence. The same is true in practice for several significant parties that are currently no longer represented in parliament (ZRS, ANO). Other parties have undergone leadership transition by default as founding party leaders became president (SOP, HZD) or withdrew from politics (KDH). Only a handful of parties have enjoyed (though for them, “enjoy” may not have been the right word) contested leadership struggles that actually changed the course of party leadership. The Party of the Hungarian Coalition (MKP/SMK) resolved internal leadership questions when it formed from its component parties in 1998 and underwent a leadership shift again in 2007. The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) underwent major leadership transitions in 1996 and 2001. The Slovak National Party (SNS) is the closest to demonstrating regular leadership change (1990, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2003) but change in party leadership after 1992 has been fraught with difficulty and appears for the moment, to be at an end.

Exit: The Frequency of Party Splintering

New party leaders in Slovakia are more likely to be leaders of new parties than new leaders of old parties. Whereas the six parties listed above have collectively only experienced seven or eight leadership changes (depending on calcuations), they have collectively experienced at least ten significant splits and splinters of parliamentary deputies or prominent party leaders. Secession is far more common than succession. It is difficult to find struggles between party incumbents and party insurgents that have left a party intact: SDL in 1994 (to the extent that Peter Weiss’s withdrawal was not entirely voluntary), SNS in 1992 and 2003, and MKP/SMK in 2007. Far more common is struggle followed by departure of the loser to form a new party: SNS in 1994 and 1999, SDL in 1999 and 2001 (and, to the extent there was a real struggle, with the departure of Luptak in 1994), KDH in 1991, 2000 (related to the dissolution of the SDK coalition) and 2007 (just last week, in fact), SDKU in 2003 and the seemingly annual HZDS splinters in 1993, 1994, 2002, 2003, (and in miniature formjust recently). In fact the only parties in which party struggles have not led to departure are the Hungarian Coalition (which is limited by the inability of Slovakia’s 11% Hungarian population to support two parties that can overcome the 5% threshold), new parties that have died before a split could occur (SOP, ANO, ZRS) and a variety of smaller parties that never by themselves passed the 5% threshold (indeed Slovakia’s small parties such as the show more robust leadership rotation and a greater ability to survive leadership struggles, perhaps because they are too small to lose any members without disappearing entirely. See The People’s Front of Judea).

Why do Slovakia’s parties splinter so easily? This is a complicated and fascinating question that I am currently working on in greater detail. Institutional barriers to entry for new parties are low, but not much lower than in other parliamentary/proportional-representation systems in Europe. A stronger answer may lie in perceptions of cost and benefit. The perception of departing may be relatively low in Slovakia because certain splinters have demonstrated electoral success (DU and ZRS in 1994, Smer in 2002) and other parties have demonstrated an ability to go from nowhere to election in a matter of months (SOP, ANO). I do not, however, have the evidence to say whether these cost perceptions are lower than in countries with fewer splinters. The second part of the answer may lie in the perceived costs of remaining within a party. This in turn relates to the perceived absence of voice.

Voice: It’s (Not) My Party

My initial observations suggest that Slovakia’s centralized party organizations make it difficult for dissenters to remain. When parties remain in the hands of their founders, as in the case of Smer, HZDS and SDKU, or become tightly bound up with a successive leader, as in the recent case of SNS, those who wish to change the party may have no choice but to go elsewhere, particularly if they openly challenge the leadership. The strength of this conclusion is mitigated somewhat by the fact that even the more collegial SDL and KDH have produced a significant share of Slovakia’s splinters, and even some in the vulnerable Hungarian Coalition appear to have considered departure. Nevertheless, it is hard for me to believe that structures more conducive to internal democracies, structures that took party control out of the hands of the founder, could produce more renewal and fewer departures. I have not read Hirschmann in a long time, but it seems like introducing genuine opportunities for voice could provide an alternative both to frustrated loyalty and to destabilizing departure.

In this regard, recent discussions within the current opposition are a very positive sign. It would appear that the current infighting within parties that are already at a low point in their political fortunes will only make matters worse–and in the short run this is true–but in the long run, the kinds of discussions emerging among second-rank leaders in SDKU, KDH and MKP/SMK are potentially conducive to long-term survival, party renewal (much needed) and electoral success. By this standards the current governing parties have a short-term advantage in internal cohesion, but are at greater risk of long-term difficulties because they include some of the most centralized parties that Slovakia has ever seen. In terms of broader patterns, the news is good because it is potentially quite normal: parties in power put themselves at risk by failing to adapt; parties out of power learn how to renew themselves and eventually rise to the challenge. If Slovakia’s current opposition can manage to find mechanisms for voice and reform from within, Slovakia could experience the novelty (for Slovakia, at least) of an opposition-coalition struggle that is not also the struggle between old parties and new.