More January 2008 UVVM
More UVVM Monthly Report for January
Google’s new graphing application makes it easy to add a few other graphs, so I offer them here. More analysis in future posts.
non-coalition parties shows three clear intervals: the small advantage held by today’s coalition parties (though they were not then in coalition) before the 2006 election, the narrowing that occurred in the election itself (suggesting that perhaps the current coalition party lead is not as big as it seems), and the current post-election interval with a 30 percentage point advantage for the coalition parties that has held stable for the past year at least.
The above short-term graph of poll results for coalition and non-coalition parties shows the dominant stability of the present interval.
The long-term graph of poll results for (loosely defined) party “blocs” parties breaks this down in a slightly different way, suggesting an overall stability for the Hungarian National SMK and for the Slovak National (apparently reciprocal) pair of SNS and HZDS, though overall numbers would suggest that a small share of this bloc’s support has been lost to Smer in the last few months (as the graph below shows in more detail). It is the “right” bloc of SDKU, KDH and ANO and SF that has faced the biggest losses over the last two years (corresponding to Smer’s gains), but results for individual parties suggest that the gains came not from SDKU or KDH but rather from ANO and SF. This is not surprising, as ANO and SF both (in their own way) appealed to voters who opposed Meciar’s authoritarian and nationalist inclinations (and clientelist corruption) but had low expectations of (or were disillusioned by) Dzurinda. It is possible that ANO and SF served as a halfway house for some of these voters’ shift to Smer, peeling them off from the previous coalition and forcing them to make new choices as those two parties declined below electability. This is only a conclusion from overall numbers (which often do not tell the whole story). I will try to find more detailed information about transfer of voter allegiance to answer this question, but if this is true, it is an important mechanism to study. (If it is true, furthermore, it suggests, that these voters may be rather fickle Smer supporters as well and may bolt if the party proves more corrupt. I predicted this too publicly in fall 2006, however, and it has yet to come true.